Wednesday, September 24, 2008

A Series of Thoughts

The notion of “modernity as negation of tradition” that Dorothy Ko brings up in her article “Cinderella Stories,” is one that was brought up both at the conference as well as by other authors we read this week. What I think is important to think about amid the clearly Eurocentric critique in this week’s reading (as articulated in Ko’s statement), is not only the imposed western ideals, but the clear hypocrisy of western feminism. Both Abu-Lughod and Narayan highlight hypocritical assumptions, Abu-Lughod stating that while American women weep for the veiled women they too are subject to the “tyranny of fashion,” and Narayan pointing to gun use and gun violence in the United States as a hypocrisy of the critique of dowry murder. What other areas of hypocrisy exist within the western feminist framework?

To speak to Claire’s point, where do we draw the line between cultural relativism and the understanding that relegating non-western practice to the statement “its just their culture” might be a cop-out? Are there, or should there, be any (even one) objective standards about the status of women? And yet further might the approach be to give more thought to the language we use today vis a vis feminism. How might we create a more nuanced feminist vocabulary?

In reaction to the conference, one question has lingered and that is: Where does the UN fall into the feminist political equation today? The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (or CEDAW) is ideally supposed to be tackling the very issues that were raised at the conference, and yet there was little, if any, mention of how the UN, an international body, is confronting the notion of feminist politics today? Are they simply ineffective? Should there be another international body of women both theorizing and creating practical ways to confront feminist politics today? And moreover, how can international networks foster more grassroots, instead of top-down, organizations?
The theme of these readings this week seems to be a question of cultural relativity.  I guess I was most confused about Dorothy Ko's article on footbinding in China.  What was she just trying to map out a historical context for footbinding?  Was she claiming that something was missing -- that we were leaving something out in our description/recount?  Is she speaking in defense of footbinding?  I would just like to flesh out the article a bit in discussion.


In the excerpt from Cinderella's Sister, Dorothy Ko discusses the history of the politics surrounding foot binding in China. Though the practice was widely criticized by western societies as being indicative of China's "uncivilization", those very western societies engaged in practices (corseting, for one) which, like footbinding, were physically harmful to females. Why, then, was the treatment of women's bodies used as a basis of judgment of one culture and not for the other?

9/25 Discussion

Dorothy Ko writes, "...no state decree or social movement can truly end footbinding until the individual lives have expired one by one. The 'voice' of these woman--not articulated voices but murmurs from within their bodies--arose from an ambiguous space between individual and national histories" (12).
For my question, I would like to examine this "ambiguous space" to which Ko refers. She admits to not understanding how exactly the issue of footbinding, which affected Chinese women individually, became the source of nationalism. She isn't quite sure if it was the work of foreign or indigenous reformers, but somehow, the national history of China and its presentation to the rest of the world used footbinding as a symbol. Is it possible for us to deconstruct this phenomenon, and hypothesize how an issue of gender inequality can be manipulated and transformed into a cultural argument for an entire people? Do the fights for unbinding women's foot and for Chinese patriotism focus on two kinds of oppression, or the same one that manifests in different ways? Do both movements have the same agenda despite the different actors? Are two kinds of evil being fought or is the power struggle the same?
I sat in the panels for "What is Feminist Politics Now?" in awe of the differing opinions, the women coming from entirely different perspectives offering their opinions.  At a panel on Friday, Uma Narayan expressed serious concerns regarding microcredit in Third World countries as a one-way bridge from point A to point B.  Describing the issues when point A exploits point B, she made the comment that bridges aren't always a positive.  This made me wonder, where do we draw the line with these bridges?  In Lila Abu-Lughod's article, "Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," she makes it clear that "we need to develop...a serious appreciation of differences among women in the world" (783).  I guess my question is how we avoid the negative bridges--with microcredit, for example--when we need to build the positive bridges like "[developing]...a serious appreciation of differences?"  When is the bridge worth the risk?  And if we don't build it, how can affluent white women learn to see --and accept for that matter-- that their view of feminism isn't universal?
The readings this week discussed the way Western feminists assume that their version of "liberty" is the only proper one. This is exemplified in Abu-Lughod's question: "Can we only free Afghan women to be like us or might we have to recognize that even after 'liberation' from the Taliban, they might want different things that we would want for them?" (787). I agree with this skeptical stance, and my response is the question: why do you think that Western women impose their own norms onto other cultures? Is it actually a reflection of the white-Western-male ideology of imperialism, that has been imposed onto other countries time and time again? Is it a feeling of superiority with respect to freedom of thought or action? But how can we say this when our own culture has such strict standards of beauty and conduct (see: the still relevant double standard, unattainable ideals in terms of skin, hair, body, etc.)? What makes the Western feminist feel so superior?

Women's Veil and Unveil

In her piece, Women's Veil and Unveil, Afsaneh Najmabadi likens the expectation that women wear the veil to the required beard, shaved head, and hat that men wear. When Iranians chose to 'modernize,' some of these practices were rejected. However, at first, men were regarded with esteem at their Europeanization and becoming a farangi'ma'ab. Women were always necessarily frowned upon for their transition to unveiling. How different are the ways in which men and women in iran 'modernized?' How alike were they?
At the conference, Dorothy Ko asked how feminism can move beyond mere critiques of eurocentrism. Most of the posts thus far have tried to answer this question and address the problem of eurocentrism.  However, it seems that we are getting close to the view of cultural relativism that Abu-Lughod warns against: "When I talk about accepting difference, I am not implying that we should resign ourselves to being cultural relativists who respect whatever goes on elsewhere as "just their culture" "(787). This kind of cultural framing is dangerous because it obscures the real "political and historical explanations" and the "serious exploration of the roots and nature of human suffering" (784). Ironically, the desire to avoid a eurocentric approach actually reinforces (or, Abu-Lughod would say, it creates) a divide between the west and the non-west by ignoring the ways in which each region has affected and influenced the other. For example, explanations of the anti-American sentiment in countries like Afghanistan that focus on culture completely miss the history of American involvement that is behind these sentiments. As Abu-Lughod points out, "cultural relativism is an improvement on eurocentrism," but "the problem is that it is too late not to interfere. The forms of lives we find around the world are already products of long histories of interactions" (786-7). 

This kind of cultural relativism is also dangerous because it can lead to the approval of objectively oppressive practices. Abu-Lughod criticizes the ways the symbolic use of the burqa and the veil as representative of the oppression of women by the Taliban, but this does not negate the fact that women were in fact oppressed by the Taliban. Abu-Lughod makes the distinction explicit: she cites the "dreaful conditions under which the Taliban placed women." The problem is the "plaster[ing]" of "neat cultural icons...over messier historical and political narratives" (785). She explains that "we need to work against the reductive interpretation of veiling as the quintessential sign of women's unfreedom, even if we object to state impositions of this form, as in Iran or with the Taliban" (786). 

I think Abu-Lughod has the answer to Ko's question: "What I am advocating is the hard work involved in recognizing and respecting differences--precisely as products of different histories, as expressions of different circumstances, and as manifestations of differently structured desires." In order to truly achieve justice for women, we must acknowledge that "there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best" (787-8).  
In Cinderella's Sisters, a Revisionist History of Footbinding Dorothy Ko asks "What do we make of the women who hid themselves from government inspection teams or reapplied the binders as soon as the inspectors left?" (p.11) The article was filled with contradicting ideas of protecting the young girls from pain and suffering and following rituals and traditions that have been around for thousands of years.  On page 18 Ko writes "women of our country are known for their bound feet, which has long been criticized by the people in Europe and America". This again brings up the idea of pushing Western ideas onto others and the moral thoughts that encompass this decision. Is it appropriate for Western countries to judge or patronize a society for participating in traditions even if it is hurting young people who can't defend themselves? What do we say to those women who bound their daughters feet amidst the cries and pleas to stop? Or what do we say to those women who disregarded the laws of their country to participate in this practice? Is it even our place to "say something"?
Reading about the ancient Chinese tradition of foot binding in Dorothy Ko's article made me wonder whether the Western world is qualified to make judgments on a foreign culture. Personally I don't agree with foot binding since it basically cripples the person, but the women who were "subjected to the treatment" were often proud of the size of their feet post-procedure. The popularity of foot binding could be called, as Abu-Lughod mentioned in her article, a "tyranny of fashion" (786). And yet I don't think Americans should be so hasty as to declaim foot binding as a barbaric, cruel and unusual form of punishment when here there are equally odd practices of injecting one's face with botulism toxins and chopping off perfectly healthy bits of oneself in order to fit a culturally idealized form.
All of the articles this week talked about cultural norms in other countries that seem completely foreign to us Western born and bred folk. But beyond pointing out the differences, these articles attempted to shed some light on the historical and culture reasons for certain traditions (ie foot binding, wearing veils and dowry murder). We are so quick to judge Iran, China and India because of we view as horrific traditions, but as Abu-Lughod points out, what gives us the right to judge? Abu-Lughod asserts that when western cultures try to "save" marginalized women, it is simply "reinforc[ing] a sense of superiority by Westerners, a form of arrogance..." (789). It is especially interesting when Afsaneh Najmabadi talkes about the veil as being a mechanism to control female sexuality. But isn't the very fact that Iranian cultures acknowledge the "active female sexuality" a positive thing compared to Americans, who exploit female sexuality to a gross extreme in the media? Dorothy Ko made an interesting point about nationalism and patriotism as somehow lessening the oppression against women: "Gu was clearly not a feminist who championed women's liberation; but in being a defender of Chinese culture he was a nationalist, even a patriot." (36) There is a very unique relationship between a person and their culture. Regardless of whether we disagree with traditions we have become accustomed to, we still feel pride in being a part of a particular culture. To bring this all back, before the Westerners go in and try to change a culture, shouldn't they first acknowledge the history and context of a tradition we may not agree with?

Reaction to Abu-Lughod

I really enjoyed Lila Abu-Lughod's, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? article. I feel that she brought up many interesting points and concepts on which it is necessary to focus. At the bottom of page 787, "We may want justice for women, but can we accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best?" I wonder how she would incorporate F-constructed-M in this quotation.
Another insteresting concept is this idea of a "third way" that we have mentioned before in discussion and class. This is brought up at the end of the third paragraph on page 788: "The concept of an Islamic feminism......Is it an oxymoron or does it refer to a viable movement forged by brave women who want a third way?"