Looking Forward

I think what this week’s readings speak to, as well as Professor Tadiar’s lecture is the façade of the universal benefits of free market capitalism and globalization. Ehrenreich’s piece speaks to the inequalities of feminism and the hierarchy and exploitation by women towards other women. According to Ehrenreich there is no longer any “purity in our consumption,” for even if we do shed the hierarchy of domestic help and clean our own houses we are still buying products that have been produced at the physical expense of someone else(69). This type of exploitation is simply masked by distance. As Ehrenreich affirms, “sooner or later, someone else will have to finish the job (70).

A proposed solution, and this is where I think all of this week’s readings fall short: Moving beyond simply making our lives “visible again" as Ehrenreich suggests as I think that’s somewhat euphemistic. I think what’s really needed is to get back to the basics and simplify our life styles. Like Ehrenreich says “our houses are unmanageable” but beyond that our entire way of being is too large to sustain” (68). Local food, local retailers, truly “fair” global sustainable products, and an active educational and progressive component required of all industry must be implemented. In terms of this notion of hierarchy of women, is it perhaps women that should on the forefront of this change? In other words, from where should this change begin?

But my lingering question is this: in several other classes the notion of population control always comes up. Considering a revised model of simplifying our lifestyles, cutting down on our consumption of resources, negating the wasteful materialistic components of capitalism, even then would there still be enough resources to go around? Should there be population control everywhere to ensure that pragmatically and naturally speaking, everyone will have access to the resources? At what point are we simply overgrown or is this a constructed concept to avoid dealing with the particulars of the currently flawed reality in which we exist? And even if we fashioned a world where all resources were available and plentiful, what would that world look like? This vision, though idealistic and far from being immediately attainable is still worth crafting. I would challenge us to think about that as well.

"The point at The Maids, apparently, is not to clean so much as it is to create the appearance of having been cleaned, not to sanitize but to create a kind of stage setting for family life. And the stage setting Americans seem to prefer is sterile only in the metaphorical sense," says Barbara Ehrenreich. When reading this article, in conjunction with Enloe's Globetrotting Sneaker, I can't help but feel disgusted and terrified by the trajectory of American consumerism/materialism. In a culture where social reproduction is completely devalued, kids' time is spent taking SAT prep classes instead of doing chores and playing with friends, and, as Ehrenreich describes in the quote above, people don't have enough time about things beyond immediate appearance, how are people ever going to slow down, pay attention to what they are consuming, or just scrub their own damn floors?
I was especially struck by Ehrenreich's statement that "the result is a kind of virtual existence, in which the trail of litter that follows you seems to evaporate all by itself...a servant economy breeds callousness and solipsism in the served." She also says later that children growing up in the 'servant economy' suffer a "metaphysical loss, a matter of no longer being centered in your environment," thus perpetuating the social alienation and apathy that arises as a result of a complicated, technological world. I've observed this firsthand a few times in watching really wealthy peers who grew up in such an environment, and some of them have the most disgusting sense of entitlement, as if the world belongs to the individual rather than the individual belonging to the world. I had a close childhood friend with this attitude and upbringing and we eventually just couldn't be friends anymore because she was selfish, careless, out of touch with reality--probably as a result of the 'metaphysical loss' that Ehrenreich mentions. Is this sad phenomenon ever going to change, or will it continue to get worse? Is it possible to make people care more about what they consume? (Or maybe I should start with, how do I make myself care more about what I consume? How can I make myself continually aware that any material pleasure I've ever experienced was possible only because of the pain of an underpaid and undervalued (probably female) worker in some distant place?) Also, who's to blame for the crisis of commodified and devalued domestic work? Surely some would say that feminists are at fault, because they decided that women could do more than just housework, thus supposedly de-valuing domestic labor. Of course, that's not fair, because women can do more than housework but they can do housework too, and so can men and children. Isn't there a happy medium somewhere, where the societal norm is for one to balance his or her work life and personal, domestic life, instead of putting too much emphasis on work and money? (And where everyone is equal and we take of the Earth and hold hands while singing and eat berries and live in the woods...)

Last discussion

In response to Sujean, I find myself wondering why there is no vocal opposition to Sachs within the university. My father is an economist and I grew up with the idea that Sachs's solutions to end poverty were incorrect before I even knew what they were, but I found it hard to reconcile with the way he is received and treated. 

I have the same questions about opposition to the IMF and World Bank. When we talked about Larkin in class, someone mentioned the protests in Seattle of the WTO that effectively shut down the meeting in 1999. Protesters came from many different groups, but they did not form a cohesive whole at the time or afterwards. If there is so much opposition to these groups from so many different people, including at the academic level, why is there no cohesive alternative institutional opposition to these institutions whose actions have enormous consequences? Or do I just not know about it?

I am sorry to report that I have not yet finished all of the reading because I just got into a(very long) disagreement with a woman that I live with about whether or not gender roles were socially constructed. We started out talking about working mothers and fathers versus stay at home parents, and we eventually had to agree to disagree in order to continue to live together. But the readings for this week show the insidious consequences of that decision. Whether or not a woman decides to work or stay at home in the US is in fact not a decision that most women face because they are not in the economic position to do so, and those that do face such a decision do so in the face of economic stability and insurance. But for the women of Enloe's article, these gender roles have devastating consequences. For an employee in a South Korean Reebok factory, it was essential to realize that the company had a vested interested in her remaining docile and passive as part of the organizing process. That it is a socially constructed role is made obvious through their own experience and their ability to organize, but I find it very troubling when potential American consumers buy into company arguments about gender roles. I think it allows for the kind of opportunity rationalizing that Sachs engages in, which is ultimately harmful to the workers themselves. 

Even though I enjoyed reading Ehrenreich's "Maid to Order" the most, I still have trouble deciding how I really feel about what she says. On the one hand, I agree with what she says, everything that she says makes sense; on the other hand, I don't find myself actually believing what she says. It pains me that she seems to vilify women who "outsource the work of the home." 

In Hong Kong, it's almost unusual to hear of a family without a "domestic helper," or "ya-ya"s (Tagalog for 'nanny'); even my ya-ya who worked for my family has a ya-ya for her son. But even though having a ya-ya in Hong Kong is the norm, my family wouldn't employ a help if we didn't really need it, and, truthfully, we do; both my parents leave at 8 in the morning and often don't return until 11 at night and they go on business trips at least twice a month. No one is left to take care of the house or the dog, especially since my sister and I are away at school. 

So naturally, I find issue with Ehrenreich's claim that, "real work... tends to vanish." I couldn't even imagine how offended my parents would be if I ever told them that they weren't doing "real" work!

I also cannot bring myself to sympathize with Ehrenreich, especially when she makes very unfair, accusatory statements like, "a servant economy breeds callousness and solipsism."

So I guess my question is, what are working women supposed to do? What am I supposed to do, if, as the daughter, I should be "filling in" for my mother, but am, instead, away at school---which my mother must work to pay for?!! Also--and maybe I'm missing the entire point of Ehrenreich's article and missing the big picture--but what is so wrong with outsourcing domestic work, when it's not a matter of relegating dirty work, but a matter of not having enough hours in the day? Also, when can the pressure on women to do everything--job, take care of and raise baby, cook, clean--be lifted? It's no wonder why more and more women are hiring other women to do housework. 

First, I want to comment on a passage from Parrena's article. When quoting Joy Manlapit, Parrena writes, "I want to be able to order someone to make me coffee, to serve me food. That is good. That is how you can take back all the hardships you experienced before. That is something you struggled for." How is it that a domestic worker struggles to be the one who forces others into enduring hardships? It is sad that domestic work makes some bitter and aspire to be the employer instead of seek ways to abolish these put downs of what the article Maid to Order states as "lower' kinds of people for a 'lower' kind of work". This leads me to my questions raised from Maid to Order.
When in 3rd grade, we sat in a circle and my teacher asked all of us to say our hobbies....I answered with cleaning, because it was one of my favorite things to do. My teacher just laughed, causing the other students to laugh at me, and said that "cleaning is not a hobby. Isn't there anything else you like to do?". To this day I still enjoy cleaning but I do realize that it isn't a hobby to some people but it is a job; a job that defines what others think of you. pg 70, "Dirt..tends to attach to the people who remove it--'garbagemen' and 'cleaning ladies'".
This article discusses the lack of male partner's help around the house and cleaning while the female works. But for the most part, a female's idea of clean is not that of a males. Would a woman actually be happy living in a house that a male thought of as clean? Wouldn't she feel the need to do more and clean it more, anyway?
Here are some other questions I have from this reading:
Another interesting issue to look at that isn't raised in this article is which person, male or female, pays for the domestic help. Since the woman is free to do work and earn money, does the man see it as she has to pay someone to do "her job"? Or will the male pay so he doesn't have to do his share around the house?
How many women who consider themselves feminists have hired domestic help? If they have, do they because they see it as 'helping' the other women get money for their families? What would their reasoning be?
What about male maids? Do they feel discriminated against? It would be neat to hear some of their stories.
Lastly, I find it interesting how housework is considered as heritable. Pg 61, "And when the person who is cleaned up after is consistently male, while the person who cleans up is consistently female, you have a formula for reproducing male domination from one generation to the next." And Pg 69, "Since most of us learn to clean from our parents (usually our mothers), any diminution of cleaning skills is transmitted from one generation to another, like a gene that can, in the appropriate environment, turn out to be disabling or lethal." Here cleaning and domestic work is seen as genetically and socially constructed. How does any woman, especially migrants and women too poor to migrate, defeat this preconception and rise above it to create a society where one's identity is not defined by her occupation and domestic work is not a woman's duty?

My question is related to the issues that Ehrenreich and Enloe brought up in their articles regarding maid services and the shoe industry, respectively.  What responsibility does the everyday consumer have to these issues?  Tadiar mentioned briefly this idea of a hierarchy of concern and feeling that our society seems to have created [we can care of the six Americans who died in Mumbai (and the Israeli Rabbi + wife), but all the Indians who died/were injured don't even have a face, name, story, and hence, sympathy].  How does this play into these issues of racialized/classcized (made up words, I know) service/labor?  The seems an overwhelming sense of apathy towards these situations -- even though consumers have the power to influence the practices of the businesses, the governmental allowances and relationships, and stances of institutions like the WTO and the World Bank -- is it because of a lack of information?  Or do people really not care?  And how do we make people care?  How do we make this issue more than just another bullet point on the (seemingly) unending list of injustices occurring throughout the world?

American Apparel clothing is all American-made and thus sweatshop free, in addition to being hip and alternative.  It also costs an arm and a leg and doesn't allow it's LA employees to join garment workers' unions.  So the question:  Is "sweatshop-free" unanimous with "humane."  In her essay "Maid to Order," Barbara Ehrenreich touches upon issues addressed in Cynthia Enloe's chapter "The Globetrotting Sneaker," when she states:  "We can try to minimize the pain that goes into feeding, clothing, and otherwise provisioning ourselves--by observing boycotts, checking for a union label, etc.--but there is no way to avoid it altogether without living in the wilderness on berries" (69).  In the case of American Apparel, we "minimize the pain," but is that enough to claim we are making a difference?  How and where do we draw the line?

To build off of Gabriella's question in relation to Professor Tadiar's lecture, I wonder how we can put an end to the vicious cycle that Parrenas calls the work transfer system. Parrenas discusses the fact that many of the women who are hired to do domestic work in America end up hiring other women to do the same work for them. Does this need to change, and if so, how? I am slightly disappointed in not having found any proposals for a solution in this article.

In her article, "The Globetrotting Sneaker," Cynthia Enloe talks about the deplorable working conditions women in shoes factories face as a result of corporate irresponsibility. As I was reading the article, I started to think about how our economy always seems to prosper at the cost of someone else-- it is as if it is impossible to have a world where everyone has a fair and equal chance. Do you think that such a world could exist? Would our economies and governments have to drastically change? What would the implications of such changes be?

 In lecture on Tuesday professor Tadiar discussed domestic work. She stated that 95 percent of caretakers in NYC are women and close to 99 percent are foreign. A phrase that resonated with me most was "the globalization of domestic work/social reproduction". Not only is there a gender division in domestic work but also a racial division. Ehrenreich discusses a slogan from "Merry Maids" saying "we scrub your floors the old fashioned way, on our hands and knees". She later goes on to discuss how this custom is considered degrading by opposing companies and independent cleaners however, it has become a marketing tool for others. How has our society allowed these customs? Is it an issue or morals or personal choice? Who is to say who should raise your children--how do you control something that is perfectly legal and a personal decision?

12/4 Discussion

Before I post my question, I need to rant a little bit...

On page 51 of Enloe's The Globetrotting Sneaker, she provides Nike's justification for opening up factories in Indonesia, where the highest record for the country's daily wage was $1.89. The justification is: "Such wages should not be seen exploitative...but rather as the first rung on the ladder of economic opportunity that Nike has extended to workers with few options."

I would like to point this out, because this is the same argument that Jeffrey Sachs uses in his book, The End of Poverty, as the foundation of his Millennium Development Goals that address worldwide poverty, hunger and disease. Sachs is the Director of The Earth Institute and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University. He is also currently Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. He is a huge, attention-drawing name at Columbia University, and a driving force behind the UN agenda. He also has a his huge following of celebrity friends such as Bono and Angelina Jolie. I just wanted to put this information out there to note that this university system fuels a lot of his popularity and his ideas, which our readings seriously criticize.

Now for my question... our readings bring up the issue of hierarchy among women, one that correlates race, something that is arbitrary yet visible, to socio-economic status both domestically and internationally. At the same time, the readings also shed light to the issue of invisibility that is embedded into this same hierarchy. For example, Enloe discusses the struggles of women that are thousands of miles away from us, who produce our name brand sneakers. We can't see them and we will never meet them. In addition, Ehrenreich talks about how we should make the housework of our respective homes "visible" again. Which is the central problem of this hierarchy among women- visibility of differences, or the invisibility of those assigned to degraded jobs?

I was struck by Barbara Ehrenreich's article "Maid to Order": more specifically, I am fascinated by how dependent these American families are on their hired domestic help. On page 69, she writes that "fewer Americans know how to clean or even to 'straighten up'", and discusses how younger generations are unable to clean up their own messes. This made me wonder where today's society is going in terms of its own idealistic liberalism versus its inability to manage in the real world. As she writes in the last paragraph on p. 69, how do people simultaneously justify their belief in their own humanitarianism and their inherent refusal to do work that is "below" them? Can these be reconciled? What would be the reaction of this tier of society if domestic workers were outlawed? Would they be able to face their own hypocrisy?

After reading Ehrenreich's article, I find myself concluding that people criticize things in very strange ways. In Halberstam's article earlier this semester, which defined the "bathroom problem," I questioned why it was necessary to put such a strong social stigma on something as basic as excretion. There is also the relic of a social stigma on sex ever since the Victorian era, as Foucault has noted, and here in this week's articles is the presence of a societal stigma against the act of maintaining cleanliness. These are very basic functions that animals perform all the time (and let's face it, humans ARE animals in the scientific sense). The problem appears to be a class/race/gender conflict, but perhaps it is driven also by the inability of society to be satisfied with admittedly ever-shifting "normality" while still maintaining the pretenses of being so. The housework industry seems to be an example of instinctive competitiveness (survival luxury of the fittest), despite its consumers' attempts to depart from associations with "animals" and "lower class." To be "normal" or "like everyone else" is to fall out of consumer culture and the modern fashion to have better things and live better lives than others. One's ability to hire (and exploit) others - in this case, maids - is yet another way to distance "self" from "other" across various racial, gender, class and national borders and within both public and private domains.

In this week’s readings, I was particularly struck by the notion of the “hierarchy of womanhood,” as Parreñas puts it. I think it all starts with this bizarre ideology that while a domestic mother is not just socially acceptable, but admirable, a paid-domestic worker is viewed as “unskilled” work. Barbara Ehrenreich’s article further illuminates this notion that “…if you clean, you’re a scumball,” a mentality that goes along with women who are paid to raise other people’s children. Whenever you watch a show like “Oprah,” there is always this incredible praise for women who are stay-at-home mothers. So why is it considered such “dirty” work when other women take on these tasks? But Perreñas and Ehrenreich write about just one source of this “hierarchy of womanhood.” What about Enloe’s essay about women in factory work? She brings up the division amongst women in a whole other context, the context of competition. It’s amazing to me that the global economy has literally turned women against each other, whether relegating Filipina women from professionals to the subordinates of rich white women, or exploiting the “women-versus-women distrust” in the work place. I think these articles speak nicely to the beginning of the semester and the “What is Politics Now?” conference. The thing preventing the feminist movement from truly progressing is this distrust and competition amongst women. My question is, how do we overcome this? How do we play off the “intersectionality” of women so that we create a stronger global alliance amongst women?

In thinking about Linda Nicholson's closing statement that we must acknowledge,that "most of us are deviants" means recognizing that the distinction between "traditional" and "alternative" families no longer has meaning, I wonder how we can challenge ourselves to think of other problematic binaries and social dichotomies. We put the words "traditional" and "alternative" in quotation marks but why not "family." In thinking about the language we use, the question arises whether to shift the vocabulary altogether or re-interpret already existing definitions. I found Brooks' poem to be an almost painful cleavage to an ideal of familial love. Why is that the faint spec of life automatically means there is, or ought to be, a connection of love between mother and cell? Is Brooks not a victim of the constraints of familial definition?

The Facts of Fatherhood article and The Myth of a Traditional Family are especially interesting when read in comparison, or rather, in dialogue, with one another. In Laqueur's in-depth account of Mary and Jordhan's custody battle, the court is ultimately the institution holding the power to decide on a solution for this family. Yet, how can coherent laws be written to regulate custody when, as Nicholson points out, there is no such thing as a truly universal family form? The fact that these battles exist all, what does that say about the obsession with 'ownership' in American culture (as pointed out by Laquer's anecote about the Algonquin chief wondering why whites can only love their own biological children)? How do the arguments/complaints of these two authors see eye to eye, and how do they differ? Which one is more convincing?

Lacquer speaks to the emotional roots of parenting, rather than biology, and I think that this explains the judgment in the Mary and Jhordan case. The specifics about the need for the involvement of a physician in order to separate a woman from a donor is an attempt to cut off this emotional investment, and the confusion in the case arose from the failure of Mary to fully explain to Jhordan her intentions, leaving his name off of the birth certificate while saying she would "acknowledge" him as the father. I agree with Lacquer that is the emotional connections of parenting, rather than biology that matter. In fact, the biological argument itself is somewhat suspect: the hormones produced by childbearing that are supposed to bond a mother to her child can also result in postpartum depression and a complete rejection and hatred toward the child. Adrienne brings up an important point about the difficulty of making this emotional parenting legal, that is, bringing  it into family law. In the case of an abandoned child, I think that the law necessarily looks to biological parents in order to find someone to take responsibility for someone that cannot be responsible for themselves. However, I think that the legal system also needs to take into account emotional parents (or "psychological parents") in cases where that parents seeks continued custody or a relationship with a child, like the Lofton v. Fluoroy case. 

In Nicholson's article, she responds to the "anything goes" critique with a somewhat puzzling argument of intolerance: "but to say that [historically new family types usually occur for a reason] does not entail that tolerance is always warranted or warranted to include all specifics" (37). But if a family should be judged on whether it provides "economic and emotional sustenance to its members, given its resources," then it seems that the literal family type is irrelevant. So what kind of family structure would Nicholson not tolerate?

I really enjoyed reading Thomas Laqueur's article "The Facts of Fatherhood," as I felt it examined the issues of what it actually means to be a parent from and interesting and pertinent perspective, including issues facing surrogate mothers, gay families, and sperm donors in his discussion. The idea of paternal rights was particularly interesting to me and brought up many other questions about the extent to which fathers or other non birth giving parents should legally have a say in what happens to the child. I have heard the argument that fathers should have to give their consent before an abortion takes place, and I find this to be an interesting and risky debate. What do you all think?

Nicholson, pg28: "Whether a type of family provides economic and emotional sustenance to its members, with special attention to children......should constitute the primary criteria by which it is evaluated. The distinction between 'traditional' and 'alternative' families gets in the way of our being able to make such considered evaluations." One example of such an alternative family is homosexual couples which have an obstacle in that, "the same gender of adult partners makes gay and lesbian households appear different from heterosexual ones in visual terms" (pg36). How can we overcome such visual discrimination that hinders our overall evaluation of a family's functional ability? Is it possible?
I also found it refreshing to read an article by a man about the family and fatherhood (Laqueur).

The Facts of Fatherhood

Lacquer suggests that we "abandon the notion that biology--facts--will somehow provide the resolution," and, for the most part, I agree; after all, if biology were never ignored, then perhaps people who had given up their children for adoption would, somewhere down the line, be able to reclaim ownership of that child, despite the lack of any emotional connection. What, then is a parent? Because if we ignore biology, then how can child support be enforced in a case in which a struggling single mother cannot get the "father" or "man who impregnated her" to pay child support? If the notion of biology is abandoned, could this deadbeat get away with not paying child support, since he never acted as or felt like the father?

The chapters from Arlie Hochschild's The Second Shift were fascinating.  Reading the justifications of Carmen and Frank intrigued me:

"By discrediting cultural models of female assertion, by strictly confining her tendency to dominate to the 'female' sphere... by raising Frank above her--putting him on a pedestal--Carmen pursued submission as part of a traditional strategy.  She squelched her assertion outside the home; she actively magnified any feelings of dependence; these were the psychological moves that kept her soul in line with her strategy" (72-73).

It boggles my mind that Carmen would "actively [magnify] any feelings of dependence" in order uphold her ideals of what family life should be.  It makes sense, obviously, but it still fascinates me, and frustrates me that people are forced to go so far as to manipulate behavior in order to keep their familial ideals in tact.  With Carmen and Frank's situations, especially, the primary reason for their having to manipulate their behavior is economic.  How do we reconcile economic issues and familial ideals?  Is manipulating behavior in the manner Carmen did the only way? 

It was refreshing to me to read Laqueur's article. I think that it is important not only with respect to fatherhood and alternative motherhoods (lesbian non-birthmothers), but even to the parents of adopted children and to non-parent caregivers (grandparents who raise their grandchildren, etc.). My question is: why do you think people generally see mothers as more legitimate parents than fathers? Is it solely a societal idea, instilled into us by the patriarchal "father works, mother stays home and raises the children" 1950s normative family structure, out of which we still haven't been able to fully escape? Or is there something within our biology that is set to recognize the mother as the most important caregiver?

The Laqueur article brought into question many ideas about parenthood that Western society ften views as fact. For example, the concept of a mother's bond with her child being stronger than that of the father. He points out that even while this may be true, it is only so because of the labor the mother has to go through in order to give birth to a child. Additionally, he seems indignant that there is no recorded "history of fatherhood" and that there is no male equivalent of feminism to "spur the study of men." I take issue with this stance because as he even admits, men are those who have been responsible for the recording of history for so long. Therefore, if this is a complaint against women for stealing the historical spotlight from men, then it is completely out of place. Likewise, the complaint that women's bond with children is seen as stronger than a father's bond is also misappropriated because in both of these cases, the power to change this historical phenomenon is in the hands of men themselves.

Laqueur's article complicates the concepts of motherhood and fatherhood. I found it interesting that he considers fathers to be "ideas" and mothers to be "fact" (Laqueur 207) - yet in his article he discusses the case of Mary K. vs. Jhordan C. in which fatherhood is legally imposed upon a lesbian couple - despite the obvious construction of a two-parent family unit, the law insisted upon inserting the biological father into the equation. On one hand one could argue that the authorities probably preferred to have Jhordan pay for childcare rather than partition welfare funds to the couple. On the other hand it appears that fatherhood is far more concrete and "factual" than Laqueur presents (where a male is not already existing in the picture, which further complicates matters taking in gender and sexuality biases [Laqueur 215-6]). Although not explicitly addressed in this article, it seems to indicate that motherhood and fatherhood are no longer (never were?) set structures, but rather fluid social constructs that are influenced by politics, culture and economic class; this suspicion is confirmed in Nicholson's article as she evaluates different types of "alternative families" (Nicholson 35-37). It seems again to return to the concept of "self" and "other" - a need for possession (in this case of the child) and the distinction of male/female roles by the heterosexual majority. Since the family structure is the elemental unit from which society presumably developed, it is interesting to see that the "relationship" of family as the "parent" and society as the "child" is reversed and society is now shaping the families...

I was a bit surprised at the turn that Laquer's article, "The Facts of Fatherhood," took as it developed.  I suppose his look at the historical viewpoints of motherhood and fatherhood (and the transitions/changes both words/identities have endured) is extremely interesting in comparison to how the definitions of motherhood and fatherhood are viewed now (as expressed fairly clearly by Arlie Hochschild's anecdotal accounts in The Second Shift), yet I think he failed to make a very strong point about fatherhood and its meaning -- especially where he would like to see it, and how he would like other fathers to embody that position.  Maybe it was wrong of me to expect that from him, yet I do think -- after reading the Nicholson, Hochschild, and Laquer's readings (unfortunately, Brooks' poem doesn't really fit into my post), it seems obvious that this unsolved issue between traditional/alternative (right/wrong?) roles and structures truly needs to be addressed as we progress into the 21st century.  Why does the government refuse to recognize the changing shape of American families -- where does this implied need to hold on to the "traditional" family structure stem from?  How do we view and confront the definitions of father/motherhood so that individuals can truly embody the responsibilities as a professional and as a parent (equally?)?  Where is the space for -- as take from an extremely early reading this semester -- the "new man's movement," and how do we -- as a society -- encourage its development?

11/20/2008

Nicholson's The Myth of the Tradition Family goes over the historical factors that created and consolidated the idea of a "traditional family". Thomas Lacquer, on the other hand, proposes abandoning biology as the determinant of assigning parental roles and rights. How would the application of his argument affect/fight against the racial, social, and economic implications embedded into the idea of a "traditional family" that she discusses? Is his suggestion a potential solution to the notion of an "alternative" family or "deviant" life against which Nicolson battles? If so, would it eradicate the "traditional v. alternative" constructs altogether or do we need more in order to accomplish this?

Something I found very interesting was the hypocracy outlined by Linda Nicholson in "The Myth of a Traditional Family". Nicholson draws a parallel between the formulation of a "traditional family" and the emergene of deviant families i.e. single parent homes, homosexual relationships etc.  She discusses the boom during the postwar period as a catalyst for family not only being defined as a mother, father and child but also for "alternative families" as well--"Such family types are no more 'alternative' to what had preceded them than had been the 1950's type to its historical predecessors". She goes on to discuss how the definition of a "traditional family" has changed from the pre-industrial era to now. Something I kept pondering through the text, however, is how can society hold such stringent ideas of what composes a family when the idea itself has changed so many times?

In reading Arlie Hochschild’s “The Second Shift,” I was made very aware of the idea of “shame” that Nicholson brings up very explicitly in her essay. Hochschild’s concept of the “myth” and the “gender strategy” are perfect examples of how families deal with the shame they feel for not being normal families (i.e woman stays at home and rears the children and man is the breadwinner). All of the couples operate out of some sort of fear: fear of losing your spouse, fear of ending up like your mother, and a general fear of judgment from people who can see that you do not conform to your gender roles. When I was first reading about Carmen and Frank, I found myself casting incredibly harsh judgments on Carmen for wanting to be a subordinate, domesticated housewife. And I realized that I’m just as much a victim to the “myth of the traditional family” as anyone else. My parents are both professional career people; for me, this is the norm. I think that Nicholson’s definition of the “traditional” family isn’t as concrete as she makes it out to be, but I definitely understand her point of how powerfully it dictates our relationships. Hochschild’s profiles of the various couples confirms this, in showing that the most effective way to deal with slight deviations from the traditional family is to come up with a strategy, or a manipulation tactic. But I suppose, in reading the Nicholson article, I felt some sort of hope that this notion of tradition is flexible and capable of reformation. If working wives and mothers used to be considered “alternative,” then we’ve definitely made strides. It makes me think that 50 years from now, someone in this same gender studies class is going to be reading about how same-sex marriage used to be non-normal…hopefully! But it all brings me back to something we’ve been talking about all semester, which is this idea that even if we are redefining “norms,” we are still acknowledge that some things are right and some things are wrong. We are still acknowledging that some people just don’t fit. So, I ask in response to Nicholson’s idea of evaluation, why evaluate at all? Wouldn’t this help to truly alleviate the dichotomy between “traditional” and “alternative”?

Event

One more Monday night event:

November 24th

Brooks Parlor 6-7:30

Women in the Workforce: Discussion with Congresswoman Carolyn B. Mahoney

6:30-7:30

I was happy to see the piece on fatherhood by Thomas W. Laqueur. How can one discuss motherhood and family without discussing fatherhood as well? Laqueur points to the fact that like the notion of the traditional family, the notions of mother and father are historically and culturally constructed 'facts.' Laqueur speaks of facts as "shifting sands" upon which ideas are built and consequently, moral codes and even law. 

I am satisfied with the way that the writers wrote with deep senses of historicity this week. Laqueur is also interested in the mistaken senses of ownership that 'parents' are compelled to feel. He sites the Algonquin chief who found it so puzzling that whites could apparently only love 'their' children, i.e., that only individual ownership entailed caring and affection." (208 Laqueur is presenting this as a polemic, that much too much emphasis is placed on 'owning' chromosomes and likenesses. But how much detachment or alienation from this matter is too much? Its a thin line.

Event

For those in class who were looking for an event in the rest of the semester that is not on a Tuesday/Thursday night, there is a lecture this Monday at 6 in 304 Barnard Hall. 

I can't figure out how to copy and paste here, but information is available at www.barnard.edu/bcrw/events.htm. 

"To Recross the Atlantic": Diasporic Art History and the Dialogic Imagination

Kobena Mercer

Monday 11/17 6:00 pm 

Reception to Follow 

Held Auditorium 304 Barnard Hall

(#1: sorry this is so late.)

After reading Maureen Larkin's article on health and healthy policies of third world countries, I had a question regarding policy development.  I figure (perhaps wrongly), that since the 70s -- as feminism resurfaced and eventually pushed itself onto the global forum -- issues of women's health/health disparities and discrimination faced by women have taken on a much more important role as well as occupied a much larger space (in the realm of gender discourse).  Yet Larkin stated that women's movements have had to instill "a gender awareness into the policies and practices of agencies in the fields of development and health at both international and local levels" (126).  Is there a reason why the international healthcare sector still needs to be advised on gender awareness?  Is the sector ignoring gender awareness based on class/race/location?  Why hasn't considering gender issues become inherent to making policies?

The pattern of this week's readings point to a theme that may best be characterized as "the imposing help." All three readings discuss certain organizational apparatus who have the intention of helping women, but seem to be misguided and ignorant of specific histories. The Grewal reading hearkened back to the "What is Feminist Politics Now?" conference and the discussion centering on the helping or harming role of international political organizations. And in the Briggs article, scathing criticism is presented of "mainstream feminism" and their role in framing (and polarizing) the sterilization debate, as well as leaving Puerto Rican feminists out of the debate altogether. And the Martin article, though in a different tone, suggests that biologists, whose fundamental job description is designed to be that of a helping agent, are in fact semantic sculptors of stereotype. Firstly, how are we to approach the modification of such systems that are supposed to be helpful? How are organizations and modes of thinking supposed to change? The question of "who" comes up here. "Who" is supposed to lead the battle for global health? Is global health a flawed term to begin with?

And in thinking about terms, I think the readings' overwhelming focus on semantics and terms and metaphors begs the question, yet again, about the valuation we place on our terms. But how can we perceive of a revision of the feminist lexicon if feminism is really feminisms? Should we strive to engage in war over terms and metaphors? In the end, won't modified terms simply end up offending someone else?

Although I found Emily Martin's article interesting, from personal experience--with biology teachers, class, textbooks, etc.--I feel as though this idea of pushing the stereotypes purposely into the discussion and language of the egg and sperm is going a bit far.  Although Martin argues that one textbook "sees menstruation as failed production" yet "employs a sort of breathless prose when it describes the maturation of sperm," I had a teacher and textbook that called the production of sperm a "matter of quantity, not quality" and the production of the egg all about quality (486).  Was this textbook implying that because sperm often lack quality that men do as well?  I don't think so.

Emily Martin presents a clear example of the ways in which language and culture are intertwined in powerful ways. She illuminates the place of metaphor in scientific discourse, particularly in the construction of the 'story' of the sperm and the egg. While making a clear case for the stereotyping of gender in scientific explanations, she asserts that culture affects science. I wonder how closed this reading is- is it possible that it is more reciprocal than this? Isn't scientific discourse a fundamental part of culture in modernity? What does it mean for us to essentialize 'science' and 'culture' in this way- as being separate from each other and influencing each other across a discursive space? I am wary of this. The relationship is much more reciprocal I think, with scientific discourse affecting culture as much as this essentialized 'culture' affects science. How might this affect her reading? Does it make the possibilities for dismantling the discourse more bleak?

In her article, "The Egg and the Sperm", Emily Martin argues that "culture shapes how biological scientists describe what they discover about the natural world," specifically in studies about reproductive systems. She proceeds to cite specific examples of how the language and descriptions of such processes in textbooks and medical journals project gendered personalities on the cells involved, thus perpetuating such stereotypes. While I found her discussion very interesting, I couldn't help but wonder if she was taking the idea too far-- is this "manipulation" of language and description really intentional? Is it, in fact, untruthful or misleading? I just had a general sense that she was splitting hairs in her argument or maybe overanalyzing some aspects of reproductive science.

Like everyone else, I thought that parts of the Martin article were far-fetched and ridiculous. She contradicts herself by first comparing an image of an active egg to a "femme fatale" and then, shortly after, voicing criticism towards the practice of"endowing cellular entities with personhood." The following excerpts especially caught my eye as places where we should critique her argument: "Although this description gives the egg an active role, that role is drawn in stereotypically feminine terms. The egg selects an appropriate mate, prepares him for fusion, and then protects the resulting offspring from harm. This is courtship and mating behavior as seen through the eyes of a sociobiologist: woman as the hard-to-get prize, who, following union with the chosen one, becomes woman as servant and mother." And the other one, "By extolling the female cycle as a productive enterprise menstruation must necessarily be viewed as a failure. Medical texts describe menstruation as the "debris" of the uterine lining...[they] imply that a system has gone awry, making products of no use, not to specification, unsalable, wasted, scrap." In the first passage she takes on the role of the sociobiologist, whatever that is, and creates a metaphor that doesn't even fit in with the biological "fact" she has just stated. The other quote is an interesting thought. If she said more to back up the claim that medical textbooks say menstruation is failure and implies a "system gone awry," could she convince us, or is she just reading too much into the word "waste"? (What about pooping? Would she say that's a "failure" of the digestive system since it too is "waste"?) And, if menstruation isn't waste, then what is it? Could the drawbacks of her article be a result of her trying to write outside of her field of expertise? If she didn't exaggerate and nit-pick so much, would be there be some validity in her argument or not?

11/13

Larkin's piece concludes that health policies that have devastating effects on the populations in developing countries are now in the hands of supranational institutions such as the IMF, UN, and World Bank. I think that this piece is interesting to consider with Tuesday's lecture in which Professor Kessler-Harris stated that health issues, in particular reproduction, is one that is a struggle between the control of the state and the control of the individual. In thinking about the article and class, why are health policies moving farther away from the individuals that deal with such decisions, and into the hands of more removed, less representative institutions? What is the trajectory that we are on in terms of policy making and in the framework of individual rights? Especially from a Western context in which human rights standards are valued and advocated the most aggressively, why does this hypocrisy exist and what greater purpose does it serve?

Thoughts on Martin

In reading Martin's article, I was fascinated as I became aware of the manner in which stereotypes about male and female nature so strongly influence the way we view science. I agree with her main thesis in that I understand the importance of becoming attuned to these biases even within the realm of science, which we often perceive as being immune to bias. However, I wonder if the reason for which sperm are viewed as more active than eggs is because sperm actively move toward the egg while the egg is stationery in the initial stage of reproduction. However, I am aware that this can be contested by the fact that eggs also move through the fallopian tubes at a different stage. Still, is it possible that sperm is objectively more active during the "main" part of reproduction? Or have I simply fallen victim to the influence of the language and manner in which we discuss the process?

I understood Emily Martin's idea about how "endowing egg and sperm with intentional action... lays the foundation for the point of viability being pushed back to the moment of fertilization" (500), but aside from point I fail to see the purpose of the article as a whole. It makes sense that she is angry that scientists continue to use intentional language in describing the reproductive process, because cells are not beings with intent or choice. However, I do not understand why she feels the need to argue so vehemently about one- or two-word choices in specific descriptions by scientists. Her criticisms of, for example, the semantics of how the sperm move along the fallopian tubes (489) seem nitpicky and counterproductive. Her points about intentional action are valid, but because she uses this as only one aspect of the greater critical whole, it is lost in a whiny-sounding discussion of the words "drift" versus "deliver". This is not likely to get the greater (patriarchal?) scientific audience to agree with her ideas, and may only annoy and alienate them.

Regarding Laura Briggs' article about sterilization in Puerto Rico, I find that the way they determine whether or not sterilization is "justified" is inherently flawed in that they do not factor in the social and economic distinctions of different classes. There was one mention that wealthier women tend to favor hospital sterilization (156). Of course one might say wealthier women will express such sentiment in such a study; they have the means to acquire it with little risk to the financial situation of their families... A poorer woman on the other hand might have to determine whether potentially having a child even at the risk of her own health and happiness would be better for the family economically (another helping hand, or $25 saved from operation procedure, or simply the will of her husband), or whether she should put her own well-being and desires at the forefront. Judging people's reactions to one question, in this case "is sterilization good or bad?", does not take into account the variety of life experiences of the subjects. Which simply highlights the fact that reproduction is and has always been a personal issue that should not be placed on a distant and impersonal public platform for government dis/approval.


I also laughed heartily at Martin's article. I study the aging of stem cells in fruit fly testes and I have remarked occasionally how very interesting they are. But this is not because I value males over females, but rather because their testes are approximately 1/3 the size of their body which goes to show where all of their prerogatives lie. If one were to compare fruit fly ovaries with testes, there would be no "derogatory" terms used for females, for their eggs mature much the same as sperm mature, and there is no preset egg cache in the body waiting to deposit over the individual's lifespan. When Martin rails about comparisons of "wastefulness," then, her characterization of females being conservative and sparing are not entirely correct. In fact to focus an entire argument on human anatomy without considering the biological systems of other gendered organisms is sort of silly, because animals are classically studied in far more detail and were dissected centuries earlier than humans due to moral squeamishness against dissecting human beings. Also, I can't imagine a Martin-esque feminist's description of the fertilization process. Maybe it would go something like "The egg sailed valiantly down the fallopian tube, while some blindly flailing tadpoles swam in the opposite direction; eventually the feebly groping sperm collided with the egg and a baby was conceived..."

In my opinion Emily Martin's piece "the Egg and the Sperm" brought more laughter than knowledge. Martin's parallels of sexism to biology are ridiculous. To say that scientific facts are in some way gender stereotyping is to argue conclusive and definite research. Biology textbooks are not being sexist when they describe the difference between sperm and eggs. They are not being sexist when they describe the process of giving birth. Perhaps I am being naive but I think it is rather far fetched to discredit the scientific world because of the language that is chosen to explain natural bodily functions. What do you think??

Emily Martin's essay provides some part of an explanation for the stereotype of women as passive, dependent creatures. If something as "exact" as biology present female's in this light, doesn't it make sense that cultural norms would assume this same notion of women? Both Larkin and Briggs show how this stereotype actually plays out in a cultural context. On the issue of reproduction, women (like the passive, dependent egg) sit around waiting to be controlled and manipulated by outside forces. Martin attributes this control to large international organizations, and Briggs questions whether this is the case on the issue of sterilization in Puerto Rico. Were big US policy-making organizations really to blame for the forced sterilization? Or, as Briggs argues, it is equally valid to claim that women actually ask for the ability to control their ability to reproduce (or not)? My question is, why does it have to be one or the other? Why is it always a matter of "victims" being forced to do something when sometimes, people are actually lobbying to make that happen? It all comes down to choice: if some people want to reproduce a whole bunch, let them! And if some people don't want to at all, why not? This seems to be the core problem with most political issues: gay marriage, abortion etc. How do we begin to create a government in which choice is the ultimate agenda?

I found The Egg and the Sperm to be a very interesting article. However, there are some questions I have with Emily Martin's implications and proposals. On page 495, she mentions, "It has been more than a century since Hermann....peered into his microscope and became the first person to see a sperm penetrate an egg, fertilize it and form the first cell of a new embryo." Surrounding this fact, she discusses how this scientific language, puts the male sperm into the active state and the female egg as the "damsile in distress", also compared to as sleeping beauty. I feel like her bringing up this fact implies that because a man first discovered or saw this biological event, that that is the reason why the male's sperm is considered as the active, aggressive, dominant part of the fertilization process. My question is, what if a woman first discovered this? If this was the case, I doubt she'd describe the egg as active. She wouldn't think about the possible sexist implications but rather just would describe the process as she saw it.
My other questions deals with the last sentence. Emily says that by "waking up such metaphors, by becoming aware of their implications" we will "improve our ability to investigate and understand nature" and thus "rob them( the metaphors) of their power to naturalize our social conventions about gender". However, she earlier gets upset when the egg was described as active because it was too active that it was aggressive and spider-like. [Which I couldn't help but compare to H. Clinton in that when she became active she was considered butch and aggressive] This quotation implies that is we change scientific writing to the egg being more active but less aggressive then it will change our stereotypes that are now social concentions that females are passive and males active. Would there then be arguments made by the men? More importantly, is this possible?

Local or Global Action?

In "Global Aspects of Health...," Larkin identifies the problem that local initiatives face; she writes that "it is more difficult to assess their impact... where a variety of officially sanctioned initatives and informal women's projects are to be found," and that "many of the more formally based programmes have been criticised for being no more than add-on initiatives to existing programmes." Are these "formally based programs" wrongly criticised? Do they serve to help or to dilute the force of a unified and broader initiative? I think that working on a local level is more effective; this way, needs that are visible only to those with an "epistemological privilege" can be addressed. However, at the same time, this way also suffers from its single-ness (by which I mean it is less accessible to the most amount of people). So, what is your opinion, which is better--or rather, if you had to choose one, which and why--action at a local or global level? Where does the balance between the two rest, how much should local initiatives rely on global initiatives, and vice versa?

11/13 discussion

Laura Briggs offers us yet another example of anticolonialist feminist activism that "inadvertently recaptiulated the terms of a US colonialist narrative" (144). Briggs calls it "the problem of speaking on behalf of the subaltern" (145). It does not matter whether one argues for or against colonialism, but rather if one "claims to "know" the desires and subjectivities" of the subaltern. For, as Briggs states, "there is no such subaltern subject" (160). The mainland feminist activists who portrayed the rise in sterilization as the result of a government policy and a mechanism of social control--the "women were forced" argument--ignored the role of Puerto Rican women both in making decisions and advocating for birth control, removing the possibility of agency altogether. 

A more complex and comprehensive history is clearly called for. But I was most interested by the response of Margarita Ostolaza Bey, who argues that "the anticolonialist discourse is also hispanophilic, antifeminist, and reactionary because it is based on the idea that the past--any past--was better" (160). Is anticolonialist discourse ultimately as problematic as colonialist discourse, because it follows the dichotomy established by the latter and results in the erasure of the actions and ultimately the agency of the colonized peoples themselves? Is it possible to conceive of an anticolonialist discourse that does not fall into this trap, or do we need to look for another kind of discourse altogether? 

Timely Readings

In almost uncanny timing, yesterday's editorial in the Spectator criticized the organizers of Queer Awareness Month for advertising the event "GenderFuck," an underwear party, far more-so than their educational programming. The piece has sparked virulent responses from many members of the queer community. In light of this week's readings I think it would be quite valuable to discuss this editorial through the lens of our readings. What does the editorial prove or disprove about the strides Rubin describes that have been made in the past several decades to reshape sexual attitudes in this country? Is this Spectator article a return to what Rubin describes as the penchant for sex negativity? The Queer community has responded to this article but what about the feminist community? They have not. Should they respond? And if so, what would that look like? To bring in this week's lecture, how might the community respond to this article using the construction of normative response and challenges? How does this article challenge, confront or problematize Butler's statement that "there is no question that gays and lesbians are threatened by the violence of public erasure, but the decision to counter that violence must be careful not to reinstall another in its place?"

Attached is the link to the editorial as well as two letters to the editor and the Editor-In-Chief's response.

THE EDITORIAL: http://www.columbiaspectator.com/node/56558
THE LETTERS: http://www.columbiaspectator.com/node/56569
THE Editor-in-Chief's Response: http://www.bwog.net/articles/groups_respond_to_inflatable_penis_controversy_plan_protest_outside_spec#jump

In reading Marcus’ essay on rape, I found that it reconfirmed a lot of the ideas in Rubin’s article on sex. Rubin makes some really interesting assertions about the evolution of sex as taboo in Western cultures. “This culture always treats sex with suspicion” and sex is considered to be “inherently sinful.” Could this be one of the causes for the cultural association between rape and death? Marcus points out that rape transcends the definition of assault crimes because of its sexual connotations. So if sex is this incredibly holy act reserved for “marriage, reproduction and love,” then of course sexual violence is going to be the closest a person can get to death while still being alive. But what if we began to de-stigmatize sex? Rubin asserts that the harsh judgments placed on the act of sex have justified the criminalization of prostitution and homosexuality. So what if sex weren’t so culturally taboo? What if people began to view sex in a more liberal way, as something we all do in whatever form we choose? Basically, why is sex such a big deal? I couldn’t help but analyze Marcus’ essay in the context of this theory within Rubin’s article. Can the de-stigmatization of sex in any way help the whole rape issue? If sex w I’m not trying to say that if sex weren’t “such a big deal” that women would be able to view rape as a less heinous crime. But what if we were to begin a revolution to subvert the sexual aspect of rape and emphasis the assault/violence aspect of rape in order to make it less traumatic for a victim? If sex were less taboo, then perhaps women could get real about sex, own their sexuality and break away from the stereotype are these sexually passive objects. And if women weren’t stereotyped as sexually passive, then perhaps rapists would not find them such an easy target. It’s a long shot, but what if…

Virginia, I completely was on the same line of thought when reading Marcus. It does make it an interesting point that in the ideal world, rape would not be embedded in the society with the opinion of women being passive and able to be raped but that we can find a way to prevent it. Rape and culture are very interesting to compare. In some cultures, women are married off to men only if they are virgins and pure....but that is not necessarily asked of the man. I found this following quotation to catch my attention: "A rapist's ability to accost a woman verbally, to demand her attention, and even to attack her physically depends more on how he positions himself relative to her socially than it does on his allegedly superior physical strength. His belief that he has more strength than a woman and that he can use it to rape her merits more analysis than the putative fact of that strength, because that believe often produces as an effect the male power that appears to be rape's cause." (pg 390) This is another interesting viewpoint of rape and society.

While reading the articles for this week, I really began thinking about being, existing as an individual, as a member of a labeled group, etc.  In lecture on Tuesday, Jess mentioned how identities are performed.  In "Decking Out: Performing Identities," Judith Butler writes, "Since I was sixteen, being a lesbian is what I've been.  So what's the anxiety, the discomfort?  Well, it has something to do with that redoubling, the way I can say, I'm going to Yale to be a lesbian; a lesbian is what I've been being for so long.  How is it that I can both "be" one, and yet endeavor to be one at the same time?  When and where does my being a lesbian come into play, when and where does this playing a lesbian constitute something like what I am?" (18).  While reading the paragraph the passage comes from, my thoughts became more and more muddled until my head was spinning trying to decide if playing my identity is creating it or if an identity must be performed in order to create it.  Is it a matter of performance or not?

Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words

Although I really enjoyed and resonated with Sharon Marcus' article, by the end of the article, I found myself wondering about female rapists. Where do they fit in in this picture? Are female rapists "manlier"? How do female rapists fit in in this portrait that Marcus has painted of male rapists? I would have loved to hear her thoughts on that, but since she didn't mention female rapists, the question has been turned to you!

Also, Marcus writes that the victim is "someone whom the would-be rapist assumes would not attempt to fight back" probably because of the "feminine fear [which] inspires the familiar sensations of 'freezing' -- involuntary immobility and silence." She contrasts it with the masculine fear, which "triggers the notorious 'fight or flight' response." Assuming that Marcus holds these responses to be inherent in all males/females, that is to say, a biological fact, then how does this fit in with the argument that "we recognize and enact our gendered selves as objects of violence" because "the criteria of feminine beauty and worthy feminine behavior, if enacted without any modification, create[s] a trammeled, passive person"?

In "Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention," Sharon Marcus discusses the idea of rape, arguing that it is a cultural script which is acted out over and over by two people who thus become the powerful rapist and the weak, passive female victim. She claims that instead of focusing on defining and punishing rape, we should put more emphasis on rape prevention-- she gives several examples of how this could be done, i.e. recognizing that it is a cultural script and then rewriting it, as well as focusing on self-defense techniques that women can employ in order to resist the powerlessness which rape imposes on them. Though Marcus gives these possible solutions to preventing rape, she concludes by saying that "self defense of course offers no final solution: it will not always be sufficient to ward off rape...While the ethical burden to prevent rape does not lie with us but with rapists and a society which upholds them, we will be waiting a very long time if we wait for men to decide not to rape." In concluding this way, it seems as if she is conceding that in the end the ultimate power to prevent rape lies with the masculine forces who rape/allow rape to happen, and thus once again assuming a position of powerlessness against rape. Do women assume the passive position in waiting for men to decide to stop raping?

I felt a strong personal connection to Judith Butler's statements in the "Personal Mimesis" section of her article, in particular to her claim that "identification and desire can coexist, and that their formulation in terms of mutually exclusive oppositions serves a heterosexual matrix." This idea was reified for me with a friend's statement as we were getting ready to go to a CQA sponsored dance: I wondered whether I should wear a dress or a button down shirt and tie; she resonded by asking whether I wanted to "attract butches or femmes". I was (probably naively) taken aback that she should see self-presentation as so fundamentally opposed to the presentation of the object of desire, and the categories as so mutually exclusive. So my question now is rather personal, very strongly biased to my own gender-neutral feelings, and probably unanswerable. Do you think that people who present as extremely masculine or feminine actually feel a strong sense of embodying the characteristics of that gender? Are they playing it up because, as Butler says, the norm is "perpetually at risk [of] becoming undone" (23)? Is it because they feel the need to create a dichotomy with the extreme of the other sex? Or am I completely off the mark and inappropriate for asking this question?

I wanted to respond to Kayla's post, because I thought it was a pretty provocative question.  It's interesting to look at parallels between white-black relationships and male-female relationships.  I feel as if there are many overlaps between the experiences of blacks and women, but I think that is because both groups are being affected by the same entity -- the white man.  It makes sense that some experiences of subordination are shared by both...  It's the approach/mentality that the white man brings to the table that dictates others respond -- if the white man comes in thinking that he the best and everyone should adhere, everyone else has to adjust.  Simone de Beauvoir would probably ignore the differences -- there wasn't really any acknowledgment of the non-white experience...yet if she thought about it she would probably agree.

In Adrian Piper's article, she quotes Davis' "Who is Black": 'The white person had to be clearly in charge at all times, and the black person clearly subordinate, so that each kept his or her place. It was a master-servant etiquette, in which blacks had to act out their inferior social position, much the way slaves had done. The black had to be deferential in tone and body language...and never bring up a delicate topic or contradict the white...this master-servant ritual had to be acted out carefully lest the black person be accused of "getting" out of his or her subordinate "place."' How does this same dichotomy relate to the relationship between men and women? What would Simone Du Beauvoir say? What positives and negatives could come of making such conclusions?

Fighting Fire With Fire

"Although on one level the men are opponents, on another level they cooperate in their agreement to play the same game" (Marcus 396)
In suggesting that we "change the script" regarding the way we think and speak about rape in modern culture, Sharon Marcus suggests that women beat rapists at their own game, by exerting their own forms of violence, thus proving themselves unfitting of the weak or vulnerable stereotype of women. Could we apply this proposal to general interactions between men and women? What would it look like if women decided to shed their mannerly demeanors and defy their expectations of vulnerability? Have we already begun to move along such a path? I think that the answer to the latter is yes, and I find it interesting to note that most women who do so become known as bitches, and "ugly feminist" ones at that. So, has this simply exacerbated violent relations between men and women? Or could this be a new form of competition between men and women as equals- both playing the same game at last?

Butler reiterates that one must define an "Other" before conceiving of a "self" (27), as Lacan originally proposed with the concept of "mirror image" self-identification. I wonder whether one is forced to define one's self in response to perceptions of "otherness" - is it not possible to develop a sexual preference before heterosexism is societally imposed on an individual, or before one recognizes in oneself and labels it with the restrictive language constructs? And speaking of language constructs - when faced with an unknown, one must either search for existing knowledge of it, or define it using familiar terms. Is it then really that surprising that identification of sexualities forms from the majority sector, which has been established as a "norm" far earlier than other gender identity labels came into existence? People tend to favor connections with others who have similar experiences, hence the formation of cohesive groups based on nationalities, races, classes, genders, etc (see current politics). Those refusing to choose a side or to play a role are categorized anyway by the existing groups. Is it possible to remove the factor of public scrutiny, and if it were possible, would the result then somehow detract from one's self-identity?

Butler describes her discomfort with "being" a lesbian: "So what's the anxiety, the discomfort?...How is it that I can both 'be' one, and yet endeavor to be one at the same time?". She goes on to discuss how the body is a cultural construction rather than a product of nature-it is constructed by our actions (i.e. bathroom scenario). Do you agree with this statement? Yes, there are socially constructed labels and roles that are expected of certain groups however, is the body truly culturally constructed-is there even a definite answer? 

Butler is my personal hero. Maybe after Foucault. But she writes following Foucault so that makes sense.

Butler talks quite a bit about the homosexual being thought of as derivative of the heterosexual... when in actuality it is the categorization of homosexual that creates the norm of heterosexuality. It exposes the "fundamental dependency of 'origin' on that which it claims to produce as its secondary effect." (22) In this way, the homosexual precedes the heterosexual. This is much like Jean Paul Sartre's theorization of the anti-semite and the jew. In order for the subject 'anti-semite' to exist, there must be an object of hatred- the jew. Subject-hood is often thought to be created through such inversions. 

Butler does, however, recognize the fault in such inversions, even when used productively. 

As gender is a performance, this subversion and resistance takes place through the performance. Performance of gender- of drag- (they are basically the same in Butler's eyes) are flexible forms of resistance. They can parody. They can simply reveal.

Does this place too much responsibility on the homosexual to reveal? Does this power/responsibility emerge by default? How can this exposition be translated onto the heterosexual subject? Can we share such power/responsibility?

10/30

Sharon Marcus discusses rape as a performance by discussing the language and "script" used to describe it. Are her solutions to confronting and changing the "rape-script" actually offer ways to change the performance of rape? To me, it seems like she adds more language and dialogue, by describing both verbal defense and female violence to fight off rape. However, I don't think that her suggestions really change the performance of rape, it only adds more of a role for the female victim. I am not convinced that her examples of self-defense really contribute to writing a new "rape-script." I guess my question is whether or not other people found her argument convincing.

Oct. 30th discussion

We talked a lot about Butler's essay in class on Tuesday, specifically about how to answer her question: "How then to expose the casual lines as retrospectively and performatively produced fabrications, and engage gender itself as an inevitable fabrication...?" Both Jess and Agi gave very concrete answers, but Butler's solution seemed considerably vaguer to me. What does it mean to "wor[k] sexuality against identity"? How can we "redeploy norms with a difference" when so many of our repetitive performances are compulsory, like the bathroom problem? 

In Nakamura's article, she discusses the use of AIM buddy icons by adolescents, especially girls, to build their identities. Thinking about this in relation to the Berger article, to what extent can a buddy icon or gaming avatar define a woman's (in this case, girl's) "attitude to herself" or say "what can and cannot be done to her"? (280) What about for adults, what kinds of "personal digital signatures of identity" do we use to establish our identity? Furthermore, what positive or negative roles can internet communication play in the relationship of male spectator to female object?

A Spectator Sport

"Men act and woman appear," writes Berger, who then goes on to say "Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at" (281). The idea that men are the spectator and women are the mechanisms of male flattery, is at once simplistic, but while I hesitate to agree with that sort of generalization the empirical data seems worthwhile. What's more interesting in Berger's assessment is that while it was men who relegated women to being the "image designed to flatter him" women perpetuate that constructed reality (281). How do women's relation to themselves effect both other women as well as the male spectator?

And moreover, drawing from hooks, women, white feminist theorists in fact, often ignore the gaze of certain women completely (a passive perpetuation, perhaps). If, as Berger suggests, women turn themselves into objects, and "objects of vision," how do women, being of different races, ethnicities, histories, reconcile the different visions they have rendered? Ultimately, are certain women in fact the stronger arbiters of the avoidance of certain womens' gazes and objectified realities? What does it mean, and how can it be applied more broadly, that "black women were able to critically assess the cinema's construction of white womanhood as object of phallocentric gaze and choose not to identify with either the victim or the perpetrator" (313)?

In "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Laura Mulvey argues that "the function of woman in forming the patriarchal unconscious is two-fold, she first symbolises the castration threat by her real absence of a penis and second thereby raises her child into the symbolic" (833).  This idea--and the obvious connection to pyschoanalysis--brought me back to Freud and to Beauvoir.  According to this argument, it is not that woman exists as a lone subject, rather like Beauvoir's point, she is seen in relation to man.  "Her real absence of a penis" even sparks the "patriarchal unconscious."  I can't help but feel to argue this is to uphold Freud's argument that a woman craves a phallus: penis envy.  Is this what Mulvey is suggesting?  If this is her suggestion, doesn't it undermine woman as existing beyond the "other?"  And is Mulvey suggesting that it's woman's fault for "forming the patriarchal unconscious" because she lacks a penis?

I don't know.  I feel like a lot is being dumped on woman.  That's all.

In Berger's article he mentions (pg 280) "woman's self being split into two. A woman must continually watch herself. She is almost continually accompanied by her own image of herself....From earliest childhood she has been taught and persuaded to survey herself continually." This idea of a woman having within her two selves: a surveyor and surveyed is a social and cultural construct. Can women learn to act differently without the need to continually imagine what others view them as? Or As Wylie mentions Wilson's view, is it "now so entrenched in the fabric of our society" that it couldn't change easily. There is a distinction between subject, surveyor, powerful and the other, surveyed, powerless. Is this a clear cut line and does it need to be drawn? Where are women in this distinction: if women are surveyors and surveyed, and considered the other because in some views we allow it?

Views of Women

John Berger discusses the manner in which the average woman "turns herself into an object- and most particularly an object of vision: a sight" ("Excerpts"; bottom left of last page). He writes that by watching themselves being "looked at" by men, women do themselves a disservice in decreasing their self-worth as well as their value in the eyes of men. I wonder, though, how much of this problem is due purely to the faults in the way women view themselves, and how much is a result of the way men look at and treat women. How much of this is actually in women's control to change? Are women really the ones who are primarily responsible for this problem? I wonder why the emphasis is on what women do wrong in this system instead of placing the "blame" on the men of whom Berger speaks.

the intersubjective gaze

I am interested in the intersubjectivity of two eyes locking- of two people looking at eachother, seeing and being conscious of the other looking back. bell hooks touches on this briefly, on the black woman looking away from the cinema in defiance. "It is difficult to talk when you feel no one is listening." (315)
WHat does it mean to look away when no one is looking back? How can you break a gaze that the other is not meeting? What intersubjectivity can be broken if their is no held gaze? Is the moment of resistance enough if only the black woman is aware of it?

The readings this week looked at different ways of seeing, and in particular how ways of seeing influence identity formation and reception. In Ramadan is Almost Here! the Visual Culture of AIM Buddies, Race, Gender, and Nation on the Internet, Lisa Nakamura writes, "AIM buddy avatars do not stand alone to signify a disembodied self; instead they represent choices made by the user who wishes to build an online identity that is warranted by a preexisting offline relationship." Nakamura brings up the notion of identity as something that we can control based on visual signals we give off. At the same time, however, she suggests that identity is also dependent on how others interpret those signals. Given these two ideas, which one defines identity? Is our identity the product of others' perceptions of the signals we give off? Or is identity something only we can define for ourselves and attempt to convey to others through these signals?

Women and Art

It makes sense that art has been/is(?) dominated by men; after all, if art is an academic activity, then women have, naturally, been shut out of that realm for the greater part of human history. Salons and formal academies in France were all organized by men, and almost always exclusive to men. It's therefore easy to see why, in "European nude[s], the painters and spectator-owners were usually men and the persons treated as objects usually women" (Berger). However, Nakamura's article on digital media made me question why sexism exists on the internet to such a high degree. In a domain like the internet, one can assume any identity imaginable, and there is virtually no limit to who can post what and where one can post it. Why, then, does it feel like an overwhelming number of software/web developers are male? What is keeping women from being more present in digital media, where criticism (for being female) can easily be dodged because of the anonymous nature of the internet? I don't mean to say or sound as if I believe that women should have to hide behind the identity of a man to publish things on the internet/be present in the digital media realm, but I just think that in such an open forum as the internet, one would assume that it would be a "place" of greater heterogeneity.

I also just want to add that in middle school, everyone used to make those "dollz," and everyone had one as their AIM buddy icon. I'm absolutely horrified that, as a little 13-year-old, I bought into this junk, especially because only now have I realized how wrong these things are. Realizations like these really make me believe that Women's and Gender Studies classes should be included in middle school (or at least high school) curriculums. Would this ever be possible?

It was an extremely interesting experience reading the article by bell hooks.  Although a bit dated, her words/claims/writing spoke - essentially - about me.  I'm trying to figure out whether I possess this oppositional gaze - whether I would classify/express it in such a manner that she describes (and claims other women to have described).  I'm trying look inside myself and examine how I regard movies.  I think that I look at all movies with a fairly critical eye -- it's not necessarily active...more of a subconscious type of action that triggers a radar anytime I see something questionable.  I feel as if when I do notice things, my realizations are separate - either about race OR gender OR class, etc.  So when bell hooks combines these things (at least the first two, in this case), it's a bit jarring.  Yet I think it's interesting to think about the lack of intersectionality of my thoughts (when watching movies), I wonder whether there's a bigger implication to this.  What would bell hooks say about the black female having separated "oppositional gazes," not one singular 'all-encompassing' oppositional gaze?  What value/merit (if any) is there in these separations as compared to the all-encompassing one?

John Berger illuminates the importance of seeing. “Seeing…establishes our place in the surrounding world” and is the basis on which we form our beliefs and experiences. In asking us (the readers) to re-imagine a one of the nude paintings, Berger is alluding to the extreme power and control we have over what we see. Like Berger, Mulvey addresses the malleability of sight by discussing the ways in which film can construct how an audience views certain subject matter. I see this concept playing out in the “real world” in terms of how people choose to dress and display themselves to the rest of the world through clothing, haircuts and makeup. In our decisions to dress a certain way (butch, femme, preppy, punk etc) we are acknowledging the power we have to manipulate the sense of sight. Mulvey and Berger both acknowledge societies ability to re-imagine things in a way that is more pleasing to an individual. So what it is that devalues this power we have over establishing ourselves in the surrounding world? Why is it that if we deviate from the norms of how we’re supposed to appear to the outside world (women=feminine, men=masculine) then we evoke a sense of “violence” (as Berger puts it)? Why does it scare people (and societies) so much when we see something that doesn’t appear normal?

In this weeks lecture we learned about the "gaze"and gendered ways of seeing. In Lacan's article it discusses the "mirror stage" when a baby realizes his/her reflection and then realizes an idealized view of himself which is unattainable. How is this paralleled to the idea of the medical gaze which is based on objective concepts which can, literally be seen. Are both unattainable or is it the definition/emphasis that people put on these "gazes" what makes them unattainable?

Berger and Mulvey both discuss the way women appear in images, and Berger in particular notes the way women conform to and perform for the male gaze. He discusses the way "a woman must continually watch herself" and how "she has to survey everything she is and everything she does because how she appears to others, and ultimately how she appears to men, is of crucial importance... her own sense of being in herself is supplanted by a sense of being appreciated as herself by another" (280). If this is a primary cause for why "men act and women appear" (281), how do you think that a widespread adoption of the burka (or something akin to it) would affect the popular representation of women in the US? Would an overt rejection of the male gaze help to liberate women who are now too absorbed in their own appearance to be able to act as truly autonomous beings? Or is there too much importance in reclaiming female sexuality, and would relinquishing this sexuality simply be a denial of what makes a woman, a woman?

Lisa Nakamura's article "Ramadan is Almoast here" examines several examples of virtual reality that provide further evidence for the objectification of female bodies, particularly in computer/video games and internet messaging. Mulvey suggests in her article that "the male figure cannot bear the burden of sexual objectification" (Mulvey 838). However, my own experience of computer gaming with text MUDs as well as graphical MMORPGs showed a trend of males playing female characters specifically for the attention attracted - in these cases "fringe benefits" of free handouts by other males trying to impress the females. One might argue that the gender-switching phenomenon only exists because the cyber world is a fantasy that bears little to no resemblance of reality, and thus males put in a female's position can overlook the physical aggression of the "male gaze" felt in real-life encounters. I find it extremely interesting that males would find female characters attractive to play because of the perceived bonuses that they get from the rest of the playerbase, while females might find the attention overbearing and unwanted; accepting gifts from others makes the character seem in a way "promiscuous," a trait which a male behind the character would be willing to exploit (possibly virtual consumerism?). The female on the other hand often finds herself in an uncomfortable position (perhaps because she is looking to socialize and is commodified instead?). Clearly there is quite a high degree of incomprehension between the genders based on perception/understanding, which influences impressions taken from experiences even if one is to "walk in the shoes" of the other gender (i.e. using a fantasy virtual-reality approach to promote feminism won't work). How does one ameliorate this difference? Sujean's and Claire's posts referred to the increasing objectification of men in modern media - does this really seem to be the answer (objectify everyone so they're all equal), or should we be working to eliminate objectification altogether?

In an excerpt from Ways of Seeing, John Berger discusses the idea of the self, and how this "self" is different for women and men. While the male's sense of self is independent of his appearance or behavior, suggesting "what he is capable of doing to you or for you," the female's identity is intertwined with her "image of herself"-- "A woman's presence expresses her own attitude to herself and defines what can and cannot be done to her. Her presence is manifest in her gestures, voice, opinions, expressions, clothes, chosen surroundings, taste-- indeed there is nothing she can do which does not contribute to her presence." If this is what determines how women are seen and whether or not they are taken seriously by others, will it ever be possible to have a society where relations between the sexes are equal? Is there any way to transcend this kind of inequality if it is so ingrained in the ways in which we see ourselves, behave towards ourselves, and exist in the world in general?

Oct. 23rd

In examining "the gaze", John Berger states that this oppressive, male gaze is active, while Laura Mulvey states that it is another manifestation of an "unconscious" patriarchal structure. How active is this "gaze"? I think that determining the answer to this question is crucial in figuring out how to fight it, and answer the answer that Claire poses. In addition, how must women fight off this gaze? Based on my personal account, I feel that I have seen a backlash in the media today, in which women impose a female "gaze" that objectifies men as well. Are women justified in doing so? If not, what other measures can be taken?

Oct 23rd discussion

In "Ways of Seeing," John Berger explains the problem of perspective as the insistence on a single, objective way of seeing.  Berger examines perspective as applied to Renaissance painting. Laura Mulvey raises the same question in film, where "the camera becomes the mechanism for producing an illusion of Renaissance space," ie the illusion of an objective reality that is only based on what the camera sees. Mulvey's solution is to free the camera from this position and acknowledge its subjectivity. This is the same solution that Sarah offered in discussion last week: to acknowledge one's assumptions and social location in order to try to achieve some sense of objectivity. How can we apply this to looking, in order to look without objectifying? 

Nurayan’s discourse of epistemic privilege was at once effective and engaging but also gave reason to pause. While in agreement about the roles of the insider and outsider ( I think the discussion of denial of theory production and taking it a step further, denial of access to models of abstract, conceptual thinking, is a crucial one to have), the problem arises in how to define an insider and how to define an outsider. Who is the oppressed? And who is the one providing comfort? Bringing in Crenshaw’s piece, when there is such intersectionality of experience and people have so many identities, how does one proclaim the identity of the oppressed? And drawing from the beginning section of Wylie’s piece, if the women’s movement is essentially “women in movement” as Wylie, I think, so nicely describes it, and there are so many categories and definitions of feminism, who determines who is an insider and who is an outsider? Can one encompass both positions?

In a different vain, I think it was also incredibly poignant to juxtapose readings about science and emotion, as both concepts, given equal attention and weight, come out seeming equivalently important and crucial to a feminist understanding, when one or both is so often dismissed as irrelevant or antithetical or damaging to feminist ideology. This then begs the question, what other arenas or structure might we too readily dismiss? And thinking about structures, in the beginning analysis put forth by Wylie, she poses the question of “just how important sex/gender structures” are “compared with other structuring principles. So, how important is the gender structure when weighed against other structures? Should there be a hierarchy?

I like the way Narayan explains one of her main ideas on page 37: "the claim to the epistemic privilege of the oppressed does imply that people who are not members of the oppressed group will have to make a great deal of effort to come to grips with the details of lived oppression. Having members of the oppressed groups as friends, sharing in aspects of their lifestyle, fighting alongside them on issues that concern them, sustaining a continuous dialogue with them, etc. can all help non-members develop a more sophisticated understanding of what a form of oppression involves. But 'outsiders' who do none of the above, who simply have an abstract sort of goodwill towards members of the oppressed group, are unlikely to have much of a clear or detailed awareness of the forms in which that oppression is experienced." Furthermore, "concerned outsiders must recognize that their concern carries with it a responsibility to actively seek out and acquire such knowledge, rather than see it as the insider's responsibility ot bring such knowledge to their attention because the oppression is 'the insider's problem." Her proposed solution (for lack of a better word) assumes that the "outsiders" to the oppressed group want to, and are willing to, understand the viewpoint of the oppressed persons. So, in what situations is this solution more effective than others? How do we get people to care enough in the first place to understand others? Do you know men who take these steps toward better understanding women? Finally, is it possible to incorporate Narayan's suggestion into education without using the "tools of a racist patriarchy" as described by Audre Lorde?

I have the same question as Hillary--is it possible for anthropology to be divorced from the cultural presuppositions of the researchers themselves?  Wylie applies Lorde's argument to science, claiming that "the tools themselves [are] part of the problem...either in generating some of the biases that feminists document or...allowing bias to reproduced" (49). Even if anthropologists acknowledge their own biases and presupptions, they do not have the tools--what historian Lawrence Goodwyn calls "conceptual options" and language--to avoid recreating them in their work. 

In addition, Narayn argues that outisders lack the epistemic privilege of insiders necessary to understand their situation (and in her talk at the conference, she spoke about the inabiity of international aid workers to understand the local context without spending a significant amount of time in the society in which they are working), suggesting that even if such tools existed, is extremely difficult to understand another society from an external perspective. 

I have only studied anthropology in this sort of indirect way, and am very interested to hear what some of the anthropology majors in the class have to say. 

Also, in response to Christine, I study physics and I was curious about whether her critiques of the social science methods themselves apply to physics. She references--but does not endorse--feminist critiques of "the whole orientation of mathematics and theoretical physics [as] ideologically masculine," but I am not sure what such are argument would look like (or whether it would be remotely convincing). I also struggled with the recurrence of Wollstonecraft's dilemma in Wylie--can we argue that women both have a right to be scientists because of their intellectual equality and that women need to be scientists because of their uniquely gendered distinct "sensibilities"/interests/approaches (45)?

I enjoyed Audre Lorde's piece, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House," because I think her basic point, while seemingly obvious, is not often discussed. As Lorde puts it, "What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable." Lorde seems to be advocating that, as feminists, we must work outside and not within the system to affect meaningful change. How, though, should we go about this? Is she advocating a complete overthrow of the system? Destruction of the state as we know it in order to rebuild society? What are the alternate tools that we can use to build our own house?