Politics versus Practicality

The question of “naturality” is evident throughout this week’s readings, i.e. Is war “natural,” is national citizenship “natural?” And yet the question of what is natural begs the question of what is real and realistic? And is it possible that what may not be “natural” may be redefined as “real” and once something is real can it not then be considered natural? How much of these paradigms are essentially renewable? In other words is it possible for Ruddick’s notion of care-giving and peace politics to gain strong relevance? Similarly, how realistic is the No Borders movement? Is it possible that women somehow have a right, a separate power almost, to declare such revolutions and make them so? What allows women to uniquely position themselves at such radical crossroads? How can these movements, which begin on the fringe, yield success as well as gain popular (and male) support?

One thing I've definitely learned in this class so far is that the words 'nature' and 'natural' should never be trusted when applied to social structures. In the first section meeting we picked apart the essentialist viewpoint stating that women are 'naturally' different from men due to biology and can therefore all come together for the feminist cause. So then, in reference to this week's readings, what is the 'nature' of masculinity? Ruddick critiques this concept of what's natural, saying that many people accept war as a 'natural' way of dealing with 'enemies,' because most political systems, which are (in my opinion) impossibly aggressive and patriarchal, use the 'natural' human desire for 'justice' as a justification for war. So, by using the words masculine and aggressive synonymously throughout her essay, is Ruddick herself falling into this trap of attributing 'natural' characteristics to specific genders? And how does the following idea fit into her argument(s)?: "the idea of assaultive masculinity is oppressive to many men who struggle with and against a gender identity that would immerse them by 'nature' in violence."
Sharma, too, uses the word 'natural' in quotations, implying its inadequacy as a justification for what she calls global apartheid, which assumes that certain people (especially 'otherized' people) belong in certain geographic locations, and that to keep these people where they 'naturally' belong, is to maintain the natural order of the world. So, is border control as much of a 'masculine' (and thus destructive) practice as war? What about colonization? Also, the No Borders movements promoting "solidarity amongst nations and rejection of the global system of nation states," and "unrestricted movement of people," (Sharma 139) would you say that such movements are in the spirit of Ruddick's antimilitarist feminist peace politics based on care? Do you think that these movements could ever succeed? What would Ruddick say about No Borders?

Yet again, I feel frustrated.  "Nonviolent caregiving offers one construction of power which refuses domination, respects embodied willfulness, but does not let abuse go unchallenged... [it] offers hints of peace and of the rice of its violation," says Ruddick in "Notes Toward a Feminist Peace Politics" (123-124).   Okay, I understand this idea.  My question is how do I implement this as an alternative for war?  I am so frustrated with the fact that I am given so much information and ideas and I have no clear way, no instructions as to how I should go about putting these ideas to use.  It is utterly maddening.  But I suppose that is the point.  I need to find my own way.  Still if caregiving "refuses domination" and "respects embodied willfulness," maybe that is a good way.  I am just left wondering how.  That's all.  Just how.

In "Notes Toward a Feminist Peace Politics," Sara Ruddick presents a thoughtful argument for antimilitarist feminism. Much of her argument, however, rests on the idea of the binary opposition of masculinity and femininity. Ruddick defines both terms circularly: masculinity is war and war is masculinity, femininity is peace and peace is femininity. By placing these two terms in opposition, she does not seem to view gender as a spectrum. There seems to be nothing in between masculine and feminine, war and peace. Is their a middle way? Would a gender identity between masculine and feminine provide insight into a way between war and peace? Can such a thing exist?

The part of Ruddick's article I found most interesting was the comparison between caregivers and militarists -- specifically, the description of how similar they both are. Both "set out to control the wills of others... [and] control within a particular conjunction of power and powerlessness" (119). Were you surprised at this comparison? Is it strange that they have so many simlarities in power structure? Do you think that this is what makes caregiving an effective alternative to militarism? Could the line between them ever be blurred (think of the attitude of the US in "liberating" women from the veil that Lila Abu-Lughod discussed in one reading last week), and could this be dangerous?

Many times the idea of creating a peace agreement is simply a facade of placating to citizens want for stability. This piece of paper holds the power of creating an umbrella for "peace" however, "the morning after" always seems to be the same-what does peace mean? Simona Sharoni questions the idea of peace and what it means to different countries citing Israel/Palestine and the North of Ireland. She discusses the idea of "accidental activism" and the idea of the housewife as roles that some women play during peace time. However, the different roles of women seemed to change drastically depending on what country she was dissecting (e.g. Belfast) Therefore, does the signing of a peace agreement really hold any power if every region, ruler, religion, country and person for that matter have their own definitions of what it means? Is there even a universal definition of peace?

I thought Sara Ruddick's analogy/comparison of caregivers and militarists was an interesting one.  Her unpacking of job of 'caregiving', I think, was fairly accurate (even though she didn't really acknowledge the roles that men play in caregiving -- or did she?  or was that the point?  either way, it seemed omitted to me).  Yet like many ideas and thoughts, the practical implementation of said idea seems partially unclear.  How does Ruddick imagine "nonviolent caregiving" in real-life situations?  Where would've, say, the escalation to the War in Iraq veered from its path toward war to a path toward "nonviolent caregiving"?  What form does this "caregiving" take?   

On Sharoni's Article...

Sharoni's question, "Is political conflict a setback or a springboard for women's liberation?" really piqued my interest especially because I really didn't know the answer myself. Rosemary Ridd (quoted on page 177) made a good point that, "when a community is involved in open conflict... there is likely to be some fluidity in social ordering," which means that political conflict is a springboard, because it facilitates the blurring of the divide between genders; during political conflict, the focus is on the nation rather than gender. I loved the example of the women in west Belfast who organized their own alarm system and found this role reversal very empowering. However, I while I meditated for a while on whether or not I thought political conflict was a setback or springboard, I realized that I was utterly answer-less and completely disappointed. What Sharoni wrote, about women only beginning "with their attempts to protect their homes, families and communities rather than with a conscious attempt to move beyond the confines of the private sphere..." (180) struck me as unfair, but it seemed like it had some truth to it. So I suppose my question is, is it fair to say that women only become active in the public sphere in a subconscious attempt to protect the private sphere? Or perhaps it is best to, as Cynthia Enloe (quoted on p. 195) said, to "not look for clear authoritative answers" to a question as subjective as "what is feminism?"

Also, another question: Is it better to use political conflict as a springboard if it gets your message "out there," or does it weaken your message because it had to come out of another, bigger movement (will your message pale in comparison or seem weaker because it couldn't have been independently fought for)?

I loved Sharma's look at the ideology that is nationalism. It is a multifaceted approach, looking at the emergence and effects of Canada's nationalism through a consideration of borders and citizenship. She takes a strongly Foucauldian stance, examining the genealogy, subjecthood, and internalization of the produced Other- the noncitizen. I am most interested in her brief reference to the internalization of the noncitizen as the other, as a racialized identity... Sharma says "People were seen, and came to see themselves, as the 'same' as those categorized in similar ways and, simultaneously as 'different' from those who were placed in other state categories of entry and residence in Canada." (130) I would have loved for her to explore this more- the way the power functions to create the noncitizen subject internally. How can we begin to think about this? As North Americans? As women? As immigrants? (I'm sure many in the class are..) What does this mean for our subject-hood?

What is the female role in politics? Does she have one, separated from that of the male sex? Does the male role define that of the female's? Here are some quotations from Sharoni's piece that I think suggest there is an existing bind that women have to men in the political world.
pg 184. ....The space available for women, at the height of the conflict, to mobilize politically and to explore new conceptions of femininity and gender roles depends to a great extent on the identities and roles of men in these conflicts and on the conceptions of masculinity that inform their personal and political struggles.
pg 200. But in order to maintain their place in Northern Ireland politics, women had to endure an overtly sexist working environment and accept a fairly conventional division of power and labour at the all-party talks.
pg 201. .....the meanings assigned to being a man or a woman in a particular context are not fixed or static but rather changing over time and in relation to particular political developments.

In her article, Sarah Ruddick discusses the so-called "masculinity of war", describing in detail her idea of masculinity as a violent, aggressive force in society. How does this idea of masculinity contrast or relate to the ideas of masculinity presented by Halberstam in "Female Masculinity"? What does it truly mean to be masculine? What is masculinity in relation to feminity? From this can we say whether masculinity is a positive, negative, or neutral force in society?

Simona Sharoni’s piece on “Gendering Conflict and Peace in Israel/Palestine and the North of Ireland,” sheds light on the relationship between war and gender. Sharoni states that although “images attached to masculinity, femininity and gender relations in situations of overt political conflict are far from universal,” there are still some very insightful observations that come from viewing gender in the context of political conflicts. To see Israeli and Palestinian women use war to facilitate their own liberation elucidates the incredible power politics have to shape social norms. In other words, in the state of weakened political system (times of war), women and marginalized groups are able to break out of their socially oppressed roles. Sharoni states that “differences and similarities between and men and women are often shaped more by the particular social and political conditions that underlie the conflict than by inherent gender differences.” (201). How can this concept be applied specifically to the American gender binary system? What political structures have served to strictly enforce gender roles?

Nandita Sharma advocates a similar strategy as Judith Jack Halberstam's idea of radical passivity. In the face of what she terms the "global apartheid," Sharma advocates for "a rejection of the global system of nation states" (139). Rather than change the idea of states or sovreignty, Sharma instead believes that "we need to engage in practices of refusal" (139). However, this is problematic for the same reasons as Halberstam's argument--how would this work? Sharma criticizes the current international concepts of nations and immigration, but she offers no way out of the existing system. She calls for a new order based not on "imposed identities...but upon radically diverse ways of organizing" which are not specified. 

In Sharona Simoni's article, she gives a variety of examples of the increased political activism among women that accompanies a colonial conflicts. However, all of these women come into the public sphere through their traditional roles in the private sphere--as mothers whose primary concern is the family. These women become aware of the gender discrimination that they face only through this new "accidental" activism. Simoni cites various women describing their political awakenings who claim that this transformation is irreversible. However, the examples of women remaining politically active in the peace process are constrained by their traditional female gender roles as mothers. The women of the NIWC end up as the token maternal figures, and the Irish women must "embrac[e] motherhood in order to justify their political stand" (200). Is it possible for these women to stay in the public political sphere as individuals outside the previous maternal role that they have supposedly transcended during the conflict itself? Do these constraints exist because of the nature of their initiation into politics, or because the space for new ideas about gender generated in conflict is only temporary? 

After reading the Ruddick and Sharma articles, I noticed a similarity between Sharma's characterization of Western nations (in particular Canada) as insular entities and Ruddick's description of the female-associated "caregiver" as "notoriously 'partial'" and "far more likely [to disobey/act] when authorities threaten their 'own' work, their 'own' people" (Ruddick 123). This then prompts the question of whether the concept of protecting the "self" in contrast with the "other" is inherently ingrained into our consciousness and if it is possible to break free of existing dichotomous barriers. Women are equally guilty of perceiving men as "other" and "alien," just as families are suspicious of outsiders (i.e. parental scrutiny of potential boyfriends/girlfriends) and nations are wary of immigrants. Declaring one dichotomy unjust has incurred questioning about other dichotomies (race, religion, gender and sexuality to name a few) and may open the door to further questioning about other dichotomies in the future - is it desirable for the world to be one massive homogenous mixture, or is there an invisible line that must not be crossed?

oct. 2 discussion post

While Nandita Sharma argues that nationalism is a dangerous ideology used to discriminate and further enforce an international hierarchy that she calls "global apartheid," Simona Sharoni argues that nationalism can empower feminism and fuel "accidental activism." Sharma devotes one paragraph (p.131)to the subject of women and men and their relationship to each other as well as races and nations. And instead, for the most part, Sharma mostly discusses the North/South, Western/non-Western relationship. Sharoni, on the other hand, discusses specific instances of an increasing role of female activists in Palestine and Northern Ireland during times of war. Are these two writers diametrically opposing each other on the basis of nationalism and providing yet another example as to how feminist discourse is divided? Is there a way for us readers to reconcile their different conclusions about nationalism, or are they making two arguments that may be incomparable and irrelevant to one another?

Feminist Peace Politics

After reading Sara Ruddick's article, I could not help but wonder how her theory would relate to the ideas about the nature of masculinity put forth by Jack Halberstam. Ruddick suggests that war is an undeniably masculine practice which stems from traits found exclusively among men. Ruddick writes, "Criminally, this "masculinity" is expressed in actual acts of rape, sexual assault, and torture" (p110), and "The misogynist domination that pervades military life and lore fosters brutality and domination both on and off battlefields" (p 113). this However, if we consider Halberstam's notion that masculinity should not be limited to biological men ("masculinity must not and cannot and should not reduce down to the male body and its effects" (p. 935)), how can we make sense of Ruddick's opinion on war and the strictly masculine nature of militarism?