I have the same question as Hillary--is it possible for anthropology to be divorced from the cultural presuppositions of the researchers themselves?  Wylie applies Lorde's argument to science, claiming that "the tools themselves [are] part of the problem...either in generating some of the biases that feminists document or...allowing bias to reproduced" (49). Even if anthropologists acknowledge their own biases and presupptions, they do not have the tools--what historian Lawrence Goodwyn calls "conceptual options" and language--to avoid recreating them in their work. 

In addition, Narayn argues that outisders lack the epistemic privilege of insiders necessary to understand their situation (and in her talk at the conference, she spoke about the inabiity of international aid workers to understand the local context without spending a significant amount of time in the society in which they are working), suggesting that even if such tools existed, is extremely difficult to understand another society from an external perspective. 

I have only studied anthropology in this sort of indirect way, and am very interested to hear what some of the anthropology majors in the class have to say. 

Also, in response to Christine, I study physics and I was curious about whether her critiques of the social science methods themselves apply to physics. She references--but does not endorse--feminist critiques of "the whole orientation of mathematics and theoretical physics [as] ideologically masculine," but I am not sure what such are argument would look like (or whether it would be remotely convincing). I also struggled with the recurrence of Wollstonecraft's dilemma in Wylie--can we argue that women both have a right to be scientists because of their intellectual equality and that women need to be scientists because of their uniquely gendered distinct "sensibilities"/interests/approaches (45)?