Tuesday, September 30, 2008

oct. 2 discussion post

While Nandita Sharma argues that nationalism is a dangerous ideology used to discriminate and further enforce an international hierarchy that she calls "global apartheid," Simona Sharoni argues that nationalism can empower feminism and fuel "accidental activism." Sharma devotes one paragraph (p.131)to the subject of women and men and their relationship to each other as well as races and nations. And instead, for the most part, Sharma mostly discusses the North/South, Western/non-Western relationship. Sharoni, on the other hand, discusses specific instances of an increasing role of female activists in Palestine and Northern Ireland during times of war. Are these two writers diametrically opposing each other on the basis of nationalism and providing yet another example as to how feminist discourse is divided? Is there a way for us readers to reconcile their different conclusions about nationalism, or are they making two arguments that may be incomparable and irrelevant to one another?

Monday, September 29, 2008

Feminist Peace Politics

After reading Sara Ruddick's article, I could not help but wonder how her theory would relate to the ideas about the nature of masculinity put forth by Jack Halberstam. Ruddick suggests that war is an undeniably masculine practice which stems from traits found exclusively among men. Ruddick writes, "Criminally, this "masculinity" is expressed in actual acts of rape, sexual assault, and torture" (p110), and "The misogynist domination that pervades military life and lore fosters brutality and domination both on and off battlefields" (p 113). this However, if we consider Halberstam's notion that masculinity should not be limited to biological men ("masculinity must not and cannot and should not reduce down to the male body and its effects" (p. 935)), how can we make sense of Ruddick's opinion on war and the strictly masculine nature of militarism?

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

A Series of Thoughts

The notion of “modernity as negation of tradition” that Dorothy Ko brings up in her article “Cinderella Stories,” is one that was brought up both at the conference as well as by other authors we read this week. What I think is important to think about amid the clearly Eurocentric critique in this week’s reading (as articulated in Ko’s statement), is not only the imposed western ideals, but the clear hypocrisy of western feminism. Both Abu-Lughod and Narayan highlight hypocritical assumptions, Abu-Lughod stating that while American women weep for the veiled women they too are subject to the “tyranny of fashion,” and Narayan pointing to gun use and gun violence in the United States as a hypocrisy of the critique of dowry murder. What other areas of hypocrisy exist within the western feminist framework?

To speak to Claire’s point, where do we draw the line between cultural relativism and the understanding that relegating non-western practice to the statement “its just their culture” might be a cop-out? Are there, or should there, be any (even one) objective standards about the status of women? And yet further might the approach be to give more thought to the language we use today vis a vis feminism. How might we create a more nuanced feminist vocabulary?

In reaction to the conference, one question has lingered and that is: Where does the UN fall into the feminist political equation today? The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (or CEDAW) is ideally supposed to be tackling the very issues that were raised at the conference, and yet there was little, if any, mention of how the UN, an international body, is confronting the notion of feminist politics today? Are they simply ineffective? Should there be another international body of women both theorizing and creating practical ways to confront feminist politics today? And moreover, how can international networks foster more grassroots, instead of top-down, organizations?
The theme of these readings this week seems to be a question of cultural relativity.  I guess I was most confused about Dorothy Ko's article on footbinding in China.  What was she just trying to map out a historical context for footbinding?  Was she claiming that something was missing -- that we were leaving something out in our description/recount?  Is she speaking in defense of footbinding?  I would just like to flesh out the article a bit in discussion.


In the excerpt from Cinderella's Sister, Dorothy Ko discusses the history of the politics surrounding foot binding in China. Though the practice was widely criticized by western societies as being indicative of China's "uncivilization", those very western societies engaged in practices (corseting, for one) which, like footbinding, were physically harmful to females. Why, then, was the treatment of women's bodies used as a basis of judgment of one culture and not for the other?

9/25 Discussion

Dorothy Ko writes, "...no state decree or social movement can truly end footbinding until the individual lives have expired one by one. The 'voice' of these woman--not articulated voices but murmurs from within their bodies--arose from an ambiguous space between individual and national histories" (12).
For my question, I would like to examine this "ambiguous space" to which Ko refers. She admits to not understanding how exactly the issue of footbinding, which affected Chinese women individually, became the source of nationalism. She isn't quite sure if it was the work of foreign or indigenous reformers, but somehow, the national history of China and its presentation to the rest of the world used footbinding as a symbol. Is it possible for us to deconstruct this phenomenon, and hypothesize how an issue of gender inequality can be manipulated and transformed into a cultural argument for an entire people? Do the fights for unbinding women's foot and for Chinese patriotism focus on two kinds of oppression, or the same one that manifests in different ways? Do both movements have the same agenda despite the different actors? Are two kinds of evil being fought or is the power struggle the same?
I sat in the panels for "What is Feminist Politics Now?" in awe of the differing opinions, the women coming from entirely different perspectives offering their opinions.  At a panel on Friday, Uma Narayan expressed serious concerns regarding microcredit in Third World countries as a one-way bridge from point A to point B.  Describing the issues when point A exploits point B, she made the comment that bridges aren't always a positive.  This made me wonder, where do we draw the line with these bridges?  In Lila Abu-Lughod's article, "Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," she makes it clear that "we need to develop...a serious appreciation of differences among women in the world" (783).  I guess my question is how we avoid the negative bridges--with microcredit, for example--when we need to build the positive bridges like "[developing]...a serious appreciation of differences?"  When is the bridge worth the risk?  And if we don't build it, how can affluent white women learn to see --and accept for that matter-- that their view of feminism isn't universal?