Wednesday, October 15, 2008
In Lorde's article "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House," she discusses her invitation to a feminist conference and essentially says that it assumes "that lesbian and black women have nothing to say about existentialism, the erotic, women's culture and silence, developing feminist theory, or heterosexuality and power" (89). Essentially she is arguing that to leave these groups out is to leave a gap in the conference in the context of understanding feminism. Crenshaw's article seems to argue the opposite when she writes that "we must recognize that the organized identity groups in which we and others find ourselves are in fact not monolithic but made up of members with different and perhaps competing identities as well" (180). When Crenshaw argues for the individual like this, is she disagreeing with Lorde's idea that groups are crucial in understanding feminism or is her recognition of the individuals within each group just a more thorough way of understanding feminism?
I thought that Wylie made some very insightful points in "Good Science, Bad Science...". Her critiques of the inherent bias in both androcentric and feminist-revisionist anthropological studies (pp. 45-8) were particularly interesting. At the end of p 47 and beginning of 48, she describes M. Z. Rosaldo's self-critique: Rosaldo projected her own Anglo-American assumption of gender bias (men in the public sphere, women in the private sphere) onto the non-industrialized societies she studied, thus creating an ethnocentric study. Thus the ideas of writers we have previously read, such as Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Lila Abu-Lughod, are brought up in an anthropological context. Is this, in essence, on the same level as the androcentric anthropological studies (of Levi-Strauss, etc.) in terms of oppression or marginalization of non-industrialized peoples? Can any society analyze or critique the practices of another? Or is the only honest way to view another society through objective contrasts of practices? Is this even possible? Can anthropology be practiced in an unbiased way?
The idea of "epistemic privilege" came up in the lecture on tuesday and in the Narayan reading. The idea that insiders of an oppressed group have an advantage of understanding the oppression over those who are outside of the group. The Narayan article discusses how the privileged view taints the perception overall since it presents itself as universal and therefore discredits other ways of knowing. We have seen this throughout history however is there truly a way to allow other voices to be heard other than "the privileged view"? This can be seen in the "advancement of democracy" by the United States in various disputes and wars. It has become something so common that people don't even think about the tainted views they are hearing. How as a society can we move away from this way of thinking?
As a biology major planning on a career in scientific research, Wylie's article on "Feminist Critiques of Science" was most thought-provoking to me. I am curious to know whether Wylie's argument, that socially constructed gender inequities seep into the sciences and cause biased results, applies to fields of research outside of psychology and gender-related development or cognizance studies. I have been developing questions as a researcher of biology (not feminist-biology, just biology in general, both animal and plant-based) and the idea that there is an invisible undercurrent of male-ness directing my hypotheses is completely alien to me. Conceivably there is/would be a bias if patriarchal institutions who fund researchers are driving scientists in particular directions for financial interest (i.e. pharmaceutical companies or biotechnology engineers), but the fundamentals of science revolve around a basic curiosity of all things, not "all things pertaining to males." I fail to understand how research on reproduction in oak trees, for instance, would have any bearing on human gender relations or hierarchy. Obviously there are entire categories of sciences that Wylie overlooks in her criticism of scientific output ("garbage in; garbage out," page 50 - really? let's just regress a few thousand years...).
I do, however, agree with her points about women lacking in the scientific fields (delineated in the section "Equity Issues in Science" p. 36-44). I believe this ties in with the general economic inequities felt by all working women, because one of the factors remains that women must choose between devotion to a graduate program for advanced studies or family, or maintain a far more hectic schedule than a male graduate student if balancing the two.
I do, however, agree with her points about women lacking in the scientific fields (delineated in the section "Equity Issues in Science" p. 36-44). I believe this ties in with the general economic inequities felt by all working women, because one of the factors remains that women must choose between devotion to a graduate program for advanced studies or family, or maintain a far more hectic schedule than a male graduate student if balancing the two.
I really enjoyed reading Wylie's article. I am an environmental biology major was incredibly curious when reading Wylie discuss Widnall's idea of the "pattern of 'leakage' of women from the training pipeline" with the women mentioned being in the sciences and engineering. (pg 42) It describes that "while white male students benefit from the self-reinforcing confidence that they belong which they acquire in part through self-identification with [largely] white male faculty for others---women, minority and foreign students---....the environment is not so reinforcing". This lowering of confidence creates a lowering in career aspirations--> and that is the leakage effect. Is it mostly in the sciences that this happens or does this occur in most work places? Does this put women in a bad light in that they are too weak to maintain their goals because of others' attitudes towards them?
On another note: Wylie talks about gender systems on page 34. She discusses Wilson's conclusion that "even if sex/gender systems are not an exclusively biological legacy---even if they are contingent and plastic enough that they could be changed 'through an exercise of will'--they are by now so entrenched in the fabric of our society that it would be enormously costly...to change them.........one option that must be weighed by any society contemplating such change is that the greater good may be better served by following the status quo to persist, even if this means sacrificing the interests of those who are disadvantaged by existing conditions." I thought this quotation brought up a lot of topics and points about which there could be lots of debate. I am just curious as to how you all reacted to this passage and if you believe it to be the truth.
On another note: Wylie talks about gender systems on page 34. She discusses Wilson's conclusion that "even if sex/gender systems are not an exclusively biological legacy---even if they are contingent and plastic enough that they could be changed 'through an exercise of will'--they are by now so entrenched in the fabric of our society that it would be enormously costly...to change them.........one option that must be weighed by any society contemplating such change is that the greater good may be better served by following the status quo to persist, even if this means sacrificing the interests of those who are disadvantaged by existing conditions." I thought this quotation brought up a lot of topics and points about which there could be lots of debate. I am just curious as to how you all reacted to this passage and if you believe it to be the truth.
Ways of Thinking
Audre Lorde writes that "It is a particular academic arrogance to assume any discussion of feminist theory without examining our many differences," and of course, I completely agree. I also agree that "Only within that interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged and equal, can the power to seek new ways of being in the world generate." I thought about how this idea, of embracing and trying to understand differences, was connected to Uma Narayan's argument, that outsiders should be more perceptive of the consequences of their actions, even though they are done with good intentions, and also that insiders should gently--not defensively--"point out why the outsider's remarks or perceptions were experienced as hurtful or offensive." I really liked these two ideas and I began to wish that everyone could read these two articles and reevaluate his/her daily interactions with each other.
However, as I continued along Lorde's article, I felt increasingly uncomfortable with her tone, especially in these three excerpts from "The Master's Tools":
- "If white American feminist theory need not deal with the differences between us, and the resulting difference in our oppressions, then how do you deal with the fact that the women who clean your houses and tend your children while you attend conferences on feminist theory are, for the most part, poor women and women of color?"
- "Why weren't other women of color found to participate in this conference? ...Am I the only possible source of names of Black feminists?" ...In academic feminist circles, the answer to these questions is often 'We did not know who to ask.' But that is the same evasion of responsibility, the same cop-out, that keeps Black women's art out of women's exhibitions, Black women's work out of most feminist publications except for the occasional 'Special Third World Women's Issue' and Black women's texts off your readings lists."
- "Now we hear that it is the task of women of color to educate white women--in the face of tremendous resistance--as to our existence, our differences, our relative roles in our joint survival. This is a diversion of energies and a tragic repetition of racist patriarchal thought."
October 15 Discussion Post
Uma Narayan talks about 'methodological humility' and 'methodological action' on behalf of outsiders in better understanding the insider's experience. However, she also argues that "...the claim to epistemic privilege for the oppressed should not be identified with the claim that the oppressed should speak for themselves and represent their own interests. That the oppressed should speak for themselves may be a thesis to which we may have a moral and political commitment quite regardless of the view that the oppressed have epistemic privilege" (38). Do you agree with Narayan on this point? Can outsiders ever properly represent or speak on behalf of the insider experience, while keeping in mind both precautions mentioned above? Contrary to Narayan's argument, should the claim to epistemic privilege of the oppressed be the prerequisite to the authority to speak for themselves and represent their experiences?
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