I like the way Narayan explains one of her main ideas on page 37: "the claim to the epistemic privilege of the oppressed does imply that people who are not members of the oppressed group will have to make a great deal of effort to come to grips with the details of lived oppression. Having members of the oppressed groups as friends, sharing in aspects of their lifestyle, fighting alongside them on issues that concern them, sustaining a continuous dialogue with them, etc. can all help non-members develop a more sophisticated understanding of what a form of oppression involves. But 'outsiders' who do none of the above, who simply have an abstract sort of goodwill towards members of the oppressed group, are unlikely to have much of a clear or detailed awareness of the forms in which that oppression is experienced." Furthermore, "concerned outsiders must recognize that their concern carries with it a responsibility to actively seek out and acquire such knowledge, rather than see it as the insider's responsibility ot bring such knowledge to their attention because the oppression is 'the insider's problem." Her proposed solution (for lack of a better word) assumes that the "outsiders" to the oppressed group want to, and are willing to, understand the viewpoint of the oppressed persons. So, in what situations is this solution more effective than others? How do we get people to care enough in the first place to understand others? Do you know men who take these steps toward better understanding women? Finally, is it possible to incorporate Narayan's suggestion into education without using the "tools of a racist patriarchy" as described by Audre Lorde?

I have the same question as Hillary--is it possible for anthropology to be divorced from the cultural presuppositions of the researchers themselves?  Wylie applies Lorde's argument to science, claiming that "the tools themselves [are] part of the problem...either in generating some of the biases that feminists document or...allowing bias to reproduced" (49). Even if anthropologists acknowledge their own biases and presupptions, they do not have the tools--what historian Lawrence Goodwyn calls "conceptual options" and language--to avoid recreating them in their work. 

In addition, Narayn argues that outisders lack the epistemic privilege of insiders necessary to understand their situation (and in her talk at the conference, she spoke about the inabiity of international aid workers to understand the local context without spending a significant amount of time in the society in which they are working), suggesting that even if such tools existed, is extremely difficult to understand another society from an external perspective. 

I have only studied anthropology in this sort of indirect way, and am very interested to hear what some of the anthropology majors in the class have to say. 

Also, in response to Christine, I study physics and I was curious about whether her critiques of the social science methods themselves apply to physics. She references--but does not endorse--feminist critiques of "the whole orientation of mathematics and theoretical physics [as] ideologically masculine," but I am not sure what such are argument would look like (or whether it would be remotely convincing). I also struggled with the recurrence of Wollstonecraft's dilemma in Wylie--can we argue that women both have a right to be scientists because of their intellectual equality and that women need to be scientists because of their uniquely gendered distinct "sensibilities"/interests/approaches (45)?

I enjoyed Audre Lorde's piece, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House," because I think her basic point, while seemingly obvious, is not often discussed. As Lorde puts it, "What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable." Lorde seems to be advocating that, as feminists, we must work outside and not within the system to affect meaningful change. How, though, should we go about this? Is she advocating a complete overthrow of the system? Destruction of the state as we know it in order to rebuild society? What are the alternate tools that we can use to build our own house?

In Lorde's article "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House," she discusses her invitation to a feminist conference and essentially says that it assumes "that lesbian and black women have nothing to say about existentialism, the erotic, women's culture and silence, developing feminist theory, or heterosexuality and power" (89).  Essentially she is arguing that to leave these groups out is to leave a gap in the conference in the context of understanding feminism.  Crenshaw's article seems to argue the opposite when she writes that "we must recognize that the organized identity groups in which we and others find ourselves are in fact not monolithic but made up of members with different and perhaps competing identities as well" (180).  When Crenshaw argues for the individual like this, is she disagreeing with Lorde's idea that groups are crucial in understanding feminism or is her recognition of the individuals within each group just a more thorough way of understanding feminism?

I thought that Wylie made some very insightful points in "Good Science, Bad Science...". Her critiques of the inherent bias in both androcentric and feminist-revisionist anthropological studies (pp. 45-8) were particularly interesting. At the end of p 47 and beginning of 48, she describes M. Z. Rosaldo's self-critique: Rosaldo projected her own Anglo-American assumption of gender bias (men in the public sphere, women in the private sphere) onto the non-industrialized societies she studied, thus creating an ethnocentric study. Thus the ideas of writers we have previously read, such as Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Lila Abu-Lughod, are brought up in an anthropological context. Is this, in essence, on the same level as the androcentric anthropological studies (of Levi-Strauss, etc.) in terms of oppression or marginalization of non-industrialized peoples? Can any society analyze or critique the practices of another? Or is the only honest way to view another society through objective contrasts of practices? Is this even possible? Can anthropology be practiced in an unbiased way?

The idea of "epistemic privilege" came up in the lecture on tuesday and in the Narayan reading. The idea that insiders of an oppressed group have an advantage of understanding the oppression over those who are outside of the group. The Narayan article discusses how the privileged view taints the perception overall since it presents itself as universal and therefore discredits other ways of knowing. We have seen this throughout history however is there truly a way to allow other voices to be heard other than "the privileged view"? This can be seen in the "advancement of democracy" by the United States in various disputes and wars. It has become something so common that people don't even think about the tainted views they are hearing. How as a society can we move away from this way of thinking?

As a biology major planning on a career in scientific research, Wylie's article on "Feminist Critiques of Science" was most thought-provoking to me. I am curious to know whether Wylie's argument, that socially constructed gender inequities seep into the sciences and cause biased results, applies to fields of research outside of psychology and gender-related development or cognizance studies. I have been developing questions as a researcher of biology (not feminist-biology, just biology in general, both animal and plant-based) and the idea that there is an invisible undercurrent of male-ness directing my hypotheses is completely alien to me. Conceivably there is/would be a bias if patriarchal institutions who fund researchers are driving scientists in particular directions for financial interest (i.e. pharmaceutical companies or biotechnology engineers), but the fundamentals of science revolve around a basic curiosity of all things, not "all things pertaining to males." I fail to understand how research on reproduction in oak trees, for instance, would have any bearing on human gender relations or hierarchy. Obviously there are entire categories of sciences that Wylie overlooks in her criticism of scientific output ("garbage in; garbage out," page 50 - really? let's just regress a few thousand years...).

I do, however, agree with her points about women lacking in the scientific fields (delineated in the section "Equity Issues in Science" p. 36-44). I believe this ties in with the general economic inequities felt by all working women, because one of the factors remains that women must choose between devotion to a graduate program for advanced studies or family, or maintain a far more hectic schedule than a male graduate student if balancing the two.